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INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION

Is transnational litigation a distinct field in need of its own distinct
procedural law? Or are the U.S. procedural rules, largely written many decades
ago and mainly with domestic litigation in mind, appropriate for today's civil
disputes that are international in scope? The question is of growing importance; in
the coming years, the American legal system likely will continue to confront
steady growth in the volume of litigation with an international dimension. This
transnationalization of court dockets across the United States appropriately brings
the return of a recurrent debate among civil procedure scholars-should one set of
procedural rules apply to disputes of all kinds, regardless of the specific substance
of the dispute? That is, should American procedural law be trans-substantive?
At first blush, the stars would seem to be aligned for rethinking the transsubstantive ideal in at least one context-transnational dispute resolution, where
some regard the complexities of contemporary practice and the sensitivities of
foreign sovereign interests as requiring substantial departure from the transsubstantive ideal.' In academia, a proliferation of new teaching materials,2 new
courses 3 and profession-wide initiatives4 suggest that transnational law5 has
For a defense of trans-substantivity in procedural law, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. The Federal
Rules Fifty Years Later: Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244-47 (1989). Despite its modem dominance, the transsubstantive ideal has always had its skeptics. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore:
Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 718, 732-39 (1975) (observing that it is "by no
means intuitively apparent" that the procedural needs of a complex antitrust action are the same as those of
a simple automobile negligence case).
2 See, e.g., GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION INU.S.
COURTS (4th ed. 2006); CHARLES S. BALDWIN IV, RONALD A. BRAND, DAVID EPSTEIN & MICHAEL
WALLACE GORDON, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK
(2004); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
ARBITRATION (2005); OSCAR G. CHASE, HELEN HERSHKOFF, LINDA SILBERMAN, YASUHEI TANIGUCHI,
VINCENZO VARANO, AND ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2007);
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2006); THOMAS
MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES INCIVIL PROCEDURE (2006); JORDAN J. PAUST, JON M. VAN DYKE, & LINDA A.
MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. (2d ed. 2005); RALPH G. STEINHARDT,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RISE OF INTERMESTIC LAW (2002);
and RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PLANNING
(4th ed. 2003).
3 See Deborah Jones Merritt and Jennifer
Cihon, New Course Offerings in the Upper-Level
Curriculum:Report of an AALS Survey, 47 J. LEG. EDUC. 524 (1997) (reporting that for the period from
1994 to 1997, international and comparative law courses constituted the largest proportion of new upperlevel courses in American law schools). Several law schools recently have introduced courses in
international and comparative law in the required curriculum, see Mathias Reimann, From the Law of
Nations to TransnationalLaw: Why We Need a New Basic Coursefor the InternationalCurriculum,22
PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 397, 415 (2004); Mathias Reimann, Taking GlobalizationSeriously: Michigan
Breaks New Ground by Requiring the Study of TransnationalLaw, MICH. B. J. 52 (Jul. 2003); Elia
Powers, Harvard Alters First-Year Program, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Oct. 9, 2006,
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/10/09/harvard.
4 Internationalizingthe First Year Curriculum, A Symposium
from the Association ofAmerican Law
Schools Annual Meeting January 3-7, 2006, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 735 (2006); Judith Areen,
Expanding Knowledge and Serving Our Communities: Academic, Civil, and International,AALS NEWS,
Feb. 2006, at 6. (detailing AALS initiatives in response to "dramatic growth in transnational law"); MidYear Meeting: Conference on InternationalLaw Examines What is Wrong with the Way We Teach and
Write InternationalLaw, 2007-1 AALS NEWS 10 (Feb. 2007); Franklin A. Gevurtz et. al., Report
Regarding the Pacific McGeorge Workshop on Globalizing the Law School Curriculum, 19 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 267 (2006).
5 The term "transnational law" was used by Philip Jessup in
his 1956 Storrs Lecture on
Jurisprudence at Yale Law School. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (defining
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entered a golden age, one in which future graduates of American law schools will
know more about foreign legal systems than generations of students that preceded
them. In the world of law practice, an influential segment of the bar regards
transnational dispute resolution as a distinct specialty, practiced and marketed as
such, 6 to be staffed with teams of lawyers of different nationality and legal
training in more than one legal system,7 and the basis for separate sections of local
and national bar associations. Moreover, as one shifts gaze from law schools and
law firms based in the U.S. to developments abroad, one sees a growing body of
treaties and other instruments distinguishing transnational from domestic
litigation,9 with the revitalized discipline of comparative law leading the way.'"
But if many discern from this set of national and international trends a
movement toward transnationalism and comparativism in American procedural
law, at least for cases with an international dimension, how confident should we
be in this forecast? Two or three decades from today, will the American civil
procedure and conflict-of-law rules applicable to transnational disputes be
noticeably different from those that govern garden-variety domestic cases? Or
will differences between the international and the domestic be differences at the
margin, as traditionally has been so?
Debate on this subject was joined in the late 1980s, after publication of
Gary Born's and David Westin's landmark, InternationalCivil Litigation in U.S.
Courts." In a lengthy introduction, Born and Westin argued that what had been
regarded as a series of loosely related topics ought to be understood as an
integrated field. When seemingly separate doctrinal areas (e.g., extraterritorial
application of law, the act of state doctrine, the immunities accorded to foreign
states) were studied together, in a systematic way, the whole was greater than the
sum of the parts. 2 Born and Westin were soon joined by others announcing the
transnational law as including "all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers").
6 See, e.g., the following law firm websites: http://www.dpw.com/practice/intllit.htm (Davis Polk &
Wardwell); http://www.debevoise.com/areasofpractice/ServiceDetail.aspx?ID=4d22f445-806c-47a-a63350d96c967bb2 (Debevoise & Plimpton), http://www.jonesday.com/intemational-litigation arbitration
(Jones Day) (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
7 See generally Richard L. Abel, Transnational Law Practice,
44 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 737, 74447 (1994) (discussing transnational staffing at various law firms).
8 See, e.g., http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/intemational/home.html
(American Bar
Committee);
Litigation
International
Association
http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/sections/international law/committee.cfm#3 (District of Columbia Bar
International Dispute Resolution Committee); http://www.nycbar.org/Committees/list.htm#i (Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on International Commercial Disputes).
9 For an overview, see Joachim Zekoll, ComparativeCivil Procedure,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1327-62 (Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., 2006). For an
overview of a related development, the harmonization of private law in the European Union, see Reinhard
Zimmermann, ComparativeLaw and the Europeanizationof PrivateLaw, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra.
10 See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Comparative Law and Private InternationalLaw, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 1363-94; John A. Jolowicz, On the Comparison of Procedures,in Law and
Justice in a Multistate World, ESSAYS INHONOR OF ARTHUR T.VON MEHREN (James A. R. Nafziger and
Symeon C. Symeonides, eds., 2002) (discussing developments in Latin America). By way of contrast,
Professor Juenger has lamented the relative absence of comparative law insight in modem efforts at
procedural reform in the U.S. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Needfor a ComparativeApproach to Choiceof-Law Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309 (1999).
GARY B. BORN WITH DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (1989) (hereinafter "Born & Westin").
12 Curtis A.Bradley & Jack Goldsmith 1II, Book Review, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 233, 239 (1993)
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arrival of a new field, "transnational litigation."' 3
Not everyone agreed with the contention that a new label, and the
transformation implied by it, was justified. To be sure, there was widespread
agreement as to certain facts: Since World War II, growth in the volume and
intricacy of litigation involving foreign parties and parallel proceedings" had
allowed a subset of U.S law firms to specialize in the area. In cases with much at
stake, multinational corporate clients retained a small army of specialists 5 to
assist them in efforts to coordinate concurrent lawsuits, to seize assets on a global
basis, and to manage worldwide litigation-related public relations.' 6 Clients
repeatedly faced with complex cases potentially implicating the laws and
regulatory policies of more than one country increasingly sought counsel with
expertise in the procedural laws of foreign legal systems, in satellite litigation,'7 in
arbitration, and even in advocacy before regional and international tribunals."
Notwithstanding general acknowledgment of these trends, some scholars
questioned the significance of these recent developments, 9 whether there was
sufficient coherence to transnational litigation as a new "field,"2 and whether any
subset of litigation in American courts is likely to shake off what have been
(reviewing GARY B. BORN WITH DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1992)) ("[O]nly by a holistic approach to the doctrines of
international civil litigation can one fully appreciate the nature and complexity of certain recurring
concepts and themes"); Linda Silberman, TransnationalLitigation:Is There a "Field?" A Tribute to Hal
Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1427, 1430 (2006) (arguing that international litigation is a field because
"the discrete doctrines can only be understood in relation to each other").
13BORN & WESTIN, supra note 11, originally referred
to the new field as "international civil
litigation." Others have used other labels. See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is TransnationalLitigation
Different? 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1297, 1312-53 (2004) (using the term "transnational litigation");
Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2382, 2390-92 (1991)
(the "Federal Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure" and the American "Law of Foreign Sovereignty");
RALPH G. STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RISE OF
INTERMESTiC LAW, at v (2002) (using the "neologism 'intermestic"' to reflect that the field combines
"elements of international and domestic life" and noting that current cases in international law "undermine
the received distinction between domestic and international law").
14For a discussion of parallel proceedings,
see Part V(A), infra.
15E.g., global asset search firms, translation services,
expert witnesses testifying on the content of
foreign or international law, accounting firms with expertise in differences among accounting standards
from one country to another.
16 See, e.g., Rufus Jones, UBS Creates a New Breed of General
Counsel: Interview with U. Roth,
INT'L FIN. L. REV. (Nov. 1, 2000), at 24; Isabel Vincent, In New York the Swiss Are Forcedto Change
Their PR style, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto Can.), January 3,1998, at D4; Philip Segal, Nike Hones Its Image
on Rights in Asia, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 26, 1998.
17 A common form of satellite litigation is when
one or more parties to the main lawsuit goes to
another forum in pursuit of preliminary relief, discovery, or sanctions.
18 In the Avena/Medellin litigation, for example, Donald
Donovan argued both in the U.S. Supreme
Court and in the International Court of Justice. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005); Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/I 28/8188.pdf.
19See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1456, 1459 (1991) (book
review) (noting the long history of international litigation in U.S. courts and the "cross-fertilization"
between doctrines and techniques developed in domestic and international litigation).
20 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw
and InternationalRelations Theory:A
DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205,230 & n 112(1993) (arguing, in referring to Born & Westin, that the
purported field lacks "an overriding organizing principle or conception that would provide identity and
cohesion to this subject area as a field"); Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational
Procedure,26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 114, 117 (1993) (arguing that separate and sequential doctrines of
international civil litigation involve "repetitive, fragmented, and ad hoc" interest-balancing tests which are
"wasteful, inefficient, and unfair").
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central features of American procedural law for a very long time-a

preoccupation with domestic interstate federalism and an understanding of
procedural rules as properly autonomous from the substantive nature of the
dispute before the court." After all, courts in the United States had served as fora
for disputes involving foreign parties and foreign law for a very long time.12 The
American bench had adapted to fluctuating patterns in world trade, to changes in
the United States' economic and political stature, and to occasional calls for the
U.S. legal system to cooperate more closely with foreign courts." Yet, over a
period of more than two hundred years, the rules of civil procedure and conflict of
laws applied in transnational cases closely tracked those that applied in domestic

cases. 24
In response to this skepticism, transnationalists assert that the changes
brought on by the current phase of globalization are different in magnitude from
those encountered by the U.S. legal system before. They argue that at successive
stages of litigation, a set of overarching principles repeatedly surface.
Regardless of the specific doctrinal issue at stake (e.g., service of process, the
effect to be given to a foreign blocking statute),26 a common pool of policy-based
considerations come into play: comity, sovereignty, the efficiency of the
international legal system as a whole, the burdens on private parties caught in the
crossfire of conflicting national regimes, the desirability of the United States
speaking with one voice on matters touching upon the interests of other countries
and international bodies. According to Born & Westin, it was these themes,
recurrent tensions, and potentially clashing policies that most defined
international litigation as a field and made it distinct from purely domestic dispute
resolution.
21 See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, American
Jurisdiction:A Story of ComparativeNeglect, 65 U.
COL.L. R. 1, 23 (1993) ("The failure of American courts and scholars to avail themselves of experience
gathered abroad is responsible for the dire state of American jurisdictional law"); Mathias Reimann,
Parochialismin American Conflicts Law, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 369, 388 (2001) ("[M]ainstream American
conflicts law continues to focus too much on purely domestic issues and to treat international problems as
an exotic sideshow.").
22 Ariel Lavinbuk has demonstrated in quantitative
terms that cases touching upon foreign affairs
constituted a large portion of the docket of the Jay and Marshall courts. See Note, Rethinking Early
Judicialhivolvement in ForeignAffairs: An EmpiricalStudy ofthe Supreme Court's Docket, 114 YALE L.
J. 855, 867-86 (2005) (analyzing every foreign affairs case, 323 out of a total docket of 1303 cases,
between the years 1791 and 1835).
23 See generally Note, Reciprocityfor Letters Rogatory Under
the JudicialCode, 58 YALE L.J. 1193,
1193-94 (1949) (summarizing U.S. practice with respect to foreign letters rogatory from the mid-I 800s to
the mid- 1900s).
24 See Burbank, supra note 19, at 1459;
Stephen B. Burbank, JurisdictionalEquilibration,the
ProposedHague Convention, and Progressin NationalLaw in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 117, 120-22 (John J. Barcelo Ill and Kevin M. Clermont, eds.,
2002).
25 See BORN & WESTIN, supra note
11, at 313-18 (referring to the need, at each stage of a
transnational lawsuit, to (a) balance foreign and U.S. interests, (b) arrive at the optimal degree ofjudicial
involvement in national foreign affairs, (c) resolve potentially competing claims by state and federal laws
and institutions in disputes touching upon relations with other countries, (d) determine the status of public
international law within the U.S. legal system, and (e) define and apply the doctrine of international
comity); see also Samuel P. Baumgartner, TransnationalLitigationin the United States: The Emergence
of a New Field ofLaw, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 793, 806-07 (2007) (book review).
26 For a short summary of blocking statutes-foreign
legislation enacted to counter extraterritorial
application of U.S. pretrial discovery methods and the U.S. judicial response to this legislation---see
GEORGE A. BERMANN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 286-99 (2003).
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Nearly two decades have passed since this debate began. In that time, has
the procedural law applied by American courts to adjudicate international disputes
become noticeably autonomous from that which governs wholly domestic
disputes? The analysis that follows will unveil an intellectual predisposition of
American courts that is rarely observed by commentators or by courts themselves.
When American courts are confronted with disputes with a transnational
dimension, they reach for a familiar toolbox-one with tools for fixing domestic
problems. They extrapolate from their experience with familiar domestic
litigation, especially interstate litigation.
II. METHODOLOGY
In approaching the question raised in the preceding paragraph, the
existing scholarship suffers from three main weaknesses. First, it tends to blur the
lines between the descriptive and the normative. Whether the procedural law
applicable to transnational litigation is meaningfully distinct from that which
governs domestic litigation is not the same question as whether it should be. Yet,
much of the work on this subject draws the conclusion that the litigation of
international disputes in U.S. courts is a separate field because it ought to be one.
Second, those who see a breakdown of the trans-substantive model in the area of
transnational disputes point to developments in law teaching,27 legal scholarship, 8
and relatively high-stakes commercial and corporate legal practice." Surprisingly
little attention has been devoted to a close reading of judicial opinions--to what
judges say and actually do. Third, the problem with extrapolating from
worldwide developments (especially initiatives in Europe) to draw conclusions
about transnationalism in contemporary American procedural law is the failure to
grapple fully with American exceptionalism-the extent to which key aspects of
civil procedure in the U.S. are not just different from other legal systems, but
much different.
The current work seeks to fill this void by focusing on two areas of civil
litigation--personal jurisdiction and pre-trial discovery-in which litigation
practice in the United States is substantially different from other legal systems,
even other common-law legal systems. The influence oftransnationalism will be
approached by analyzing two sets of data. The first is a representative selection of
judicial opinions in disputes that possess some international dimension, such as
the presence of foreign litigants, the possible application of foreign law, or the
need at some point in the proceedings to secure the assistance of foreign courts.
The second are opinions in cases in which all of the parties are based in the U.S.,
no assistance from foreign authorities is required, and all of the applicable law
consists of state or federal statutes or regulations or common law from U.S.
jurisdictions.
The focus on judicial opinions is based on an assumption about American
27 See Silberman, supra note 12, at 1431 (arguing that for
both teacher and student it is critical to see
a set of issues arising in the transnational context as part of an "interconnected whole").
28

See Baumgartner, supra note 13.

29

See Silberman, supra note 12, at 1430 (describing how lawyers handling transnational cases
see

themselves operating in a distinct field due to the practical realities of their work).
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legal culture that should be made explicit. The judicial opinion has long been
central to the way that Americans think about law. Notwithstanding the
importance of statutes and regulations, essentially every part of the legal
profession in the U.S.--the bar, the academy, all branches of state and local
government-and even the public at large (at least in the case of opinions of the
U.S. Supreme Court) fixate on judicial opinions, perhaps because the American
legal culture is one in which judicial review of legislation has existed for so long,
the range of societal disputes submitted to courts is so broad, and the stature of
judges is so high. Given these entrenched characteristics of legal culture in the
United States, one is unlikely to make a convincing case about transnationalism in
American procedural law based solely on trends in law teaching, big firm
litigation practice, and legal scholarship. Courts matter. If the procedural gulf
between the transnational and the wholly domestic is widening and the separation
is likely to be lasting, then the trend should be surfacing in case law. Specifically,
we should be able to see differences in the way that courts approach procedural
issues in the transnational and the domestic settings. When substantively similar
domestic and transnational cases are put side by side, we should see patterns, such
as a hesitation to apply precedents developed in domestic cases to cases with an
international dimension.
As we pursue the comparison between domestic and transnational case
law outlined above, a specific subset of domestic case law (interstate case law) is
of particular interest. These are cases in which all of the parties are domestic but
from different states of the U.S. Our focus on these cases is motivated by several
considerations: First, in terms of personal jurisdiction and incentives to forum
shop, interstate litigation bears some similarity to transnational litigation;
typically, one of the litigants is in its home forum and the other is presumed to be
at risk of disadvantage. Second, in both situations the interests of sovereign
entities, with potentially clashing substantive laws, lurk in the background. Third,
in both kinds of cases, assistance from courts or other authorities outside the
forum may be needed. Finally, the pervasiveness and importance of interstate
litigation is an important facet of American exceptionalism in procedural law. 0 It
is difficult to think of another country in which the sovereign attributes of
component states is expressed so strongly in private civil litigation (through, e.g.,
the exercise of personal jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules, rules relating to certain
aspects of evidence and immunity).
When this interstate-international comparison is carried out, it becomes
apparent that one important set of transnational actors, state and federal judges,
continue to regard disputes that cross national borders essentially as variations on
those that cross state borders. For many on the American bench, the procedural
30 Although other countries are federal in structure (e.g., Australia,
Canada, Germany), none exhibit
the phenomenon of interstate or interprovincial litigation in the form and with the level of importance to
the society as occurs in the United States. The overall uniqueness or "exceptionalism" of the United States
in this regard results from a combination of key theoretical features of the American founding and the
subsequent history and traditions of the United States: (1) the lines that separate one region of the country
from another are not merely administrative or electoral, but jurisdictional as well; (2) at the core of
American federalism is the principle that most of private law should emanate not from the national
government but rather from smaller political communities; (3) the principle, which was strongly felt at the
founding, that a citizen of one state forced to litigate in the courts of another state is in need of structural
safeguards to protect that litigant from possible bias.
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law employed in the latter is presumptively that which must be employed in the
former, with perhaps modest adjustments. So, for example, courts faced with
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction repeatedly apply the same
intellectual framework in evaluating due process with respect to domestic
defendants and foreign defendants alike. They have done so over a long period of
time, both in the current era of minimum contacts and in past eras, when
jurisdiction was driven by conceptions of territoriality.
One byproduct of this pattern is that complicated facets of American
domestic law, especially interstate federalism, are carried over to transnational
settings in which such preoccupations are poorly suited. A fundamental aspect of
American procedural law, such as its predisposition in favor of concurrent
jurisdiction 3' (a predisposition with roots in American interstate federalism),32 is
carried over to transnational cases. Our transnational procedural jurisprudence
becomes in part a collection of domestic doctrines that are out of place, without
any clearly useful purpose. A second byproduct is that American exceptionalism
is given free reign in the precise set of circumstances in which this tendency
should be questioned. It is, after all, one thing for Americans to launch a
"revolution" in choice-of-law methodology as applied to interstate conflict of
laws.33 It is quite another matter to apply that methodology-one that has been
tepidly received elsewhere--to cases in which the laws of other countries are
being denied applicability.
When these patterns are examined at a macro level, we see a form of U.S.
exceptionalism that is rarely discussed--the tendency of the American bench to
approach transnational scenarios from the perspective of interstate frameworks,
precedents, and policy concerns. These patterns help us to identify a penchant for
approaching civil litigation in the wider world through the lens of interstate
federalism and the domestic American experience. The principal benefit of
identifying this trend is in uncovering a major source of judicial resistance to
transnationalism in procedural law---the continuing inclination of the American
bench to approach the water's edge as if it were similar to the interstate borders
that underlie many generations of precedent in U.S. procedural law.

31 In this context, concurrent jurisdiction means that for any given
lawsuit, more than one court in the
United States may be able to exercise jurisdiction, and two or more of these suits may even go forward at
the same time. The resulting opportunities for forum shopping and parallel litigation on this scale are far
less common in other legal systems.
32 The American legal system's tolerance for concurrent jurisdiction
is in part an outgrowth of the
sovereignty that each state of the Union possesses. Congress has never enacted legislation designed to
steer state court litigation toward the one state with the closest connection to a dispute or the greatest
policy interest in the dispute's outcome. Indeed, such legislation would trigger serious objections that
Congress had overstepped a limitation on its legislative power-federalism. See Kurt H. Nadelman,
IgnoredState Interests: The FederalGovernment andInternationalEfforts to Unify Rules ofPrivateLaw,
102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954).
33 See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution:
An EmpiricalStudy, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 357, 379 (1992); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Needfor a ComparativeApproach to Choiceof-Law Problems,73 TUL. L. REV. 1309 (1999) (criticizing the excesses of the "revolution" and urging a
return to nineteenth-century openness to comparative law); Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's
Governmental Interest Analysis, in 215 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 78, 198 (1989) (describing the introduction of interest analysis by Brainerd
Currie as a "watershed" in American conflicts law).
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INTERSTATE-INTERNATIONAL EQUIVALENCE

One way of categorizing civil litigation in the United States is to divide
disputes into three groups: (1) strictly local disputes; (2) interstate disputes; and
(3) transnational disputes. Local disputes are those in which all parties are not
only American but also from the same state. Interstate disputes are those in which
all parties are American but at least two opposing litigants are from different U.S.
states. Transnational disputes are those in which at least one significant aspect of
the case is foreign.34 This taxonomy, though admittedly simplistic,35 can be
useful. When state and federal cases are sorted in this way, a striking feature of
American procedural law becomes apparent: American courts treat interstate and
international disputes remarkably alike, and they have done so for a very long
time.36
An example of this interstate-international equivalence at work can be
found in Babcock v. Jackson,37 a case central to the modern conflicts revolution38
in the United States and prominently featured in every widely read American case
book on conflict of laws. Like much of the modern conflicts canon, Babcock
involved a car accident and the conflicting laws of multiple jurisdictions. In
refusing to apply Ontario's guest statute, 9 the New York Court of Appeals found
the place of the accident lacking in significance from the perspective of loss
distribution, the central issue in the case. The laws of New York were to be
applied, according to the court, because both litigants were from New York, the
car in which they set out was registered and insured in New York, and because the
post-accident distribution of financial loss had little bearing on Canada's central
policy concern--the safety of its roads.
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions treat the foreign situs of
the accident (Canada) as important. Moreover, in the many cases that
34 The label "transnational" can be used even when all parties are domiciled
in or incorporated in the
same country but important evidence is located abroad, one or more legal issues is governed by foreign
law, or the need arises to enforce the final judgment in another country.
35 Into which category, for example, would one put a suit by
a Michigan corporation against another
Michigan corporation, where the latter is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Dutch entity, which may be the
subject of U.S. discovery requests?
36 Actually, the full story is more complicated. Many facets
of interstate procedural law in the
United States originated with a movement in the opposite direction-from the law of nations to domestic
law. See e.g., Burbank, supra note 19 at 1466-73 (adjudicative jurisdiction and arbitration); Robert C.
Casad, Jurisdictionin Civil Actions at the End of the Twentieth Century: Forum Conveniens andForum
Non Conveniens, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91 (1999) (discussing approach to forum shopping and
doctrine of forum non conveniens); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our InternationalConstitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 51-55 (2006) (analyzing full faith and credit cases); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for
Globetrotting,28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1995) (noting U.S. Supreme Court's "preoccupation
with domestic constitutional puzzles" in approaching transnational jurisdictional problems); Mathias
Reimann, Domestic and International Conflicts Law in the United States and Western Europe, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRIEDRICH K.
JUENGER (Patrick J. Borchers and Joachim Zekoll, eds., 2001) (reviewing choice of law jurisprudence).
37 12 N.Y.2d 473
(1963).
38 For an overview of the "revolution" in scholarship and
jurisprudence regarding choice of law in
the United States from the 1950s to the present, see, e.g., EUGENE G. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J.
BORCHERS, AND SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 25-105 (4th ed. 2004).
3 An Ontario statute barred a passenger from suing the driver of an automobile
if the passenger was
a guest at the time of the accident. See 12 N.Y. 2d at 477.
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subsequently have relied upon Babcock, there is not more than a passing
observation that Babcock's new approach to tort conflicts was unveiled in a
transnational setting rather than the more typical interstate setting." It is as if the
car and its passengers had crossed the border with Vermont rather than with
Ontario. At the heart of this equivalence is an approach to foreign statutes that is
common-if it is written in English, then it can be interpreted as if it were the
statute of a sister state.' The Babcock court never pauses to consider whether
differences in the legislative process and the means of recording legislative
history make assessing the legislative policies of another country different from
assessing the legislative policies of another state of the Union.42 With its silence in
this respect, Babcock leaves us to wonder whether the court has considered and
rejected an approach to choice of law that distinguishes between transnational and
interstate cases, or, perhaps, it has not considered this geographic variable at all.43
Babock is not an anomaly." Other landmark cases in conflicts law and
40

Occasionally, courts state that the conflicts rules applied in transnational cases are the same as

those in interstate cases but then fail to explain why this should be so. See, e.g., Southwell v. Widing
Trans. Inc. 101 Wash. 2d 200, 208-11 (1984) (Dore, J., dissenting) (finding choice-of-law analysis in case
at bar involving a defendant from British Columbia "indistinguishable" from a key precedent involving a
defendant from Kansas); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 669 n.2 (CA 1974) ("[California's
governmental interests approach is applicable not only to situations involving multistate contacts but also
to those involving a state of the United States vis-a-vis a political entity of a foreign country.").
41 For more on this unilateral aspect to the way that U.S. courts approach foreign statutes and the
policy concerns of other countries, see, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E. 2d 454, 455 (N.Y. 1972)
(belatedly observing that the court in Babcock erred in its superficial analysis of the policies underlying
the Ontario guest statute); seegenerally Andrew N. Adler, Translating& InterpretingForeign Statutes, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 37, 39 (1997).(arguing that U.S. courts "often mistakenly tend to perceive foreign law as
quite similar to domestic law" and naively apply what they regard as a "plain" meaning to foreign
provisions); Dimitrios Evrigenis, InterestAnalysis, A ContinentalPerspective, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 525, 527
(1985) (presenting a perceptive criticism of this facet of interstate-international equivalence); Juenger,
supra note 10, at 1328 ("Not only d[o] American courts cite spurious authority for asserted foreign
policies, but at times they altogether avoid[] discussing policies other than domestic ones").
42 For a discussion of different approaches to the use of legislative history,
even between common
law courts in the United States and those in Great Britain, see Adler, supra note 41, at 98-103 (noting
differences in the roles of legislative committees and also differences in approach to statutory drafting);
James J. Brundey, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of Lords and
the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1 (2007); cf also Evrigenis, supra note 41, at 528 (arguing that
one of the principal conflicts methodologies that has followed from Babcock, interest analysis, operates in
a "rather limited area of law and social life" and involves "totemized legislative policy concepts").
43 For further illustrations of this unilateral aspect to the way that U.S. courts approach foreign
statutes and the policy concerns of other countries, see the following widely cited choice-of-law cases:
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (declining to examine British regulatory policies
or the claim that British law establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme over the London reinsurance
market because the case does not present a true conflict; the defendant is capable of complying with the
laws of both the UK and the U.S.); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974) (concluding,
without considering any Mexican legal sources, that Mexico had no interest in the application of its
statutory ceiling on recovery in wrongful death cases). InMilkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155 (1973), the
court sweepingly declared "[W]e are firmly convinced of the superiority of the common law rule of
liability to that of the Ontario guest statute," even though the court conducted no analysis of the Ontario
statute, its legislative history, or Canadian case law interpreting and applying it. In response, the dissent
had this to say: "We may assume that these Canadian citizens have concurred in the rule of law of their
own govemment as just, so the law of this American forum is not for them the "better standard ofjustice."
Id. at 417-18.
" In the absence of clear guidance as to the content of the law of a foreign country, U.S. courts often
choose simply to apply the law of the forum. See, e.g., In the Matter of Oil Spill by The Amoco Cadiz,
954 F.2d 1279, 1315 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying federal admiralty law to questions of contribution and
comparative fault because parties did not argue that French law applied, because "no one has furnished us
with the tools to decide the question under French law" and because "[a]ll parties cast the question as one
of American maritime law without explaining why"), see generally EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY,
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civil procedure arise from transnational contexts,"5 and in striking out in new
directions in such cases, courts rarely explain whether there is anything in the
transnational fact pattern before them that limits the applicability of the holding or
reasoning when applied in wholly domestic cases. Sometimes, as in the postBabcock cases, interstate-international equivalence takes the form of an opinion in

a transnational case becoming a central precedent for interstate cases. At other
times, the movement is in the opposite direction; doctrine that has been developed

through wholly domestic interstate cases is extended without comment to cases
that are transnational.
This latter form of equivalence is illustrated by the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction, where post-World War II doctrine has been
driven by fairness to the defendant, as measured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the principle that one state should not be
permitted to impinge upon the prerogatives of another. 6 Both considerations first
surface in cases in which the defendant is domestic, with strong ties to the United
States based on citizenship, domicile, or place of incorporation. From domestic
constitutional history and considerations of interstate federalism, the Court builds
a set of analytical frameworks and concepts: minimum contacts, 7 purposeful
availment," "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"4 and so forth.
These concepts and frameworks are then put to use in transnational cases, where
PATRICK J. BORCHERS, & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 12.19 (3d ed. 2000).
45 For other examples drawn from the choice-of-law canon,
see Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 397 (1930) (Mexico and Texas); Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408,412-17 (Minn. 1973) (Ontario
and Minnesota); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-03 (N.Y. 1954) (England and New York). In Home
Insurance, an important early case on constitutional limits on choice of law, Justice Brandeis did not
consider significant differences between allowing the law of the forum to displace foreign law (in that case
Mexican law) as opposed to displacing the law of another state. Two of the most important cases on
general jurisdiction arise from transnational fact patterns. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (wrongful death action in Texas court against Colombian corporation where
accident took place in Colombia); Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (suit
in Ohio against mining company incorporated in the Philippines). Neither of the opinions in these cases
gives any indication that the jurisdictional standard would have been different if the fact pattern had been
interstate. Lower courts repeatedly have applied the Supreme Court's analysis in Helicopterosin domestic
interstate cases without pausing to consider whether the standard for exercising general jurisdiction over
non-resident domestic corporations should be the same as for non-resident foreign corporations. See, e.g.
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) (an interstate case regarding
"continuous and systematic contacts" based on activity on the internet with the court carefully noting that
Perkins and Helicopteroswere not internet cases but failing to observe that Perkins and Helicopteroswere
transnational cases, unlike the case at bar). Similarly, the modem liberal attitude toward forum selection
clauses and other conflicts issues relating to contract law was first displayed in international cases and then
extended to purely domestic disputes. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalizationof Contractual
Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421, 440 (1995).
46This principle was prominent in Justice White's majority opinion
in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,292 (1980). Within a few years, however, the view that the Due Process
Clause was not an instrument for guarding the boundaries of interstate federalism prevailed. See Insurance
Corp. ofIreland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-703, n.10 (1982) (stating that
the Due Process Clause "represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty"); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,472 & n. 13 (1985). Some
scholars call for reviving the view that there is a federalism or sovereignty-based component to the Due
Process Clause. See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: PersonalJurisdictionOver
NonresidentAlien Defendants,41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006); Allan R. Stein, Styles ofArgument and
InterstateFederalism in the Law of PersonalJurisdiction,65 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987).
47 See International Shoe v. State of Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
48 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 252-53 (1958).
49 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940).
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the issue is whether the forum may exercise jurisdiction over defendants who are
not domiciled in, resident in, or incorporated in any state of the United States.
This transplantation takes place without what would seem to be a necessary pause:
is the interstate case truly analogous to the transnational one? Underneath
superficial similarities, are there different interests to be considered?"0
Both versions of equivalence, from interstate to international and from
international to interstate, have deep roots.5 The American case law of the
nineteenth century is densely populated with examples of courts plucking from
the law of nations well established principles governing the relations among
sovereign nations52 and transporting these principles to disputes implicating not
the interests of foreign nations but those of quasi-sovereign states in a federal
union."

A.

The First Wave ofAmerican Transnationalism

This similarity in the treatment of interstate and international cases has
been noted before, but only sporadically.54 After World War II,
when the potential
arose for U.S. juridical influence to rise in tandem with economic influence,55 a
50 Another illustration of this form of interstate-international
equivalence is the expansion of the
complete diversity rule of subject-matter jurisdiction from interstate diversity cases to alienage diversity
cases. See Cuebas Y Arredondo v. Cuebas Y Arredondo, 223 U.S. 376, 388 (1912) (relying on
Strawbridge v. Curtiss in concluding that complete diversity is required in alienage diversity cases without
even considering possible differences between the two types of diversity).
51 See, e.g., SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE
QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE
CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS (1828) (bringing the
thinking of European statuists to bear on U.S. domestic conflicts problems). In his judicial opinions and
scholarly writings, Joseph Story repeatedly turned to the law of nations and continental European authors
for analogies to U.S. interstate conflicts problems. See Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362 (1820)
(Story, J.) (collecting U.S. cases and analyzing foreign sources); Commentaries on the Conflict ofLaws,
Foreign and Domestic (1834). For later examples of this influence on the jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court, see Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724 (noting that in the decades immediately
following ratification of the Constitution, courts looked without hesitation to international law for
guidance in resolving conflict of laws problems, such as whether to apply the forum's statute of
limitations); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657,666,669 (1892) (relying on pre-Constitution international
law in holding that penal judgments fall outside the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); see also
Cleveland, supra note 36, at 49-54 (2006) (describing use of international law as a "structural analogy for
the federal system").
52 The term "law of nations," used widely in the
17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, is not synonymous
with the modem term "international law." See generally Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern
lus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 132-37 (2005) (explaining the 'broader meaning" of the term "law of
nations").
53See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (looking to "well-established
principles of
public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State" and finding that each state of the United
States "possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory" to
the exclusion of other states); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (evaluating the status of a slave
brought into a free state in terms of principles of international law); see generally Thomas H. Lee, Making
Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: InternationalLaw and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1027
(2002) (arguing that principles of the law of nations have often provided a template for Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence).
54 See, e.g. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS, §10,

Reporter's Note ("By and large, American courts and writers have not distinguished between international
and interstate conflicts for choice-of-law purposes.").
55 See generally LOUIS HENKIN AND ALBERT J. ROSENTHAL, EDS., CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND

RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD (1990) (tracing the influence of
U.S. constitutionalism on the practices of other countries and on international human rights instruments).
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handful of conflicts scholars argued that the American legal system's tendency to
project interstate frameworks onto transnational fact patterns was a hindrance to
fostering a more efficient and predictable international regime for resolving
transnational commercial disputes. 6 They argued that the path to such a regime,
with its benefits to U.S. business interests, lay in integrating U.S. courts into the
emerging transnational system of judicial cooperation. 7
In 1958, Congress created the Commission and Advisory Committee on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure (the "Commission") and charged it with
recommending changes in American procedural law so as to improve judicial
The Commission
cooperation between the U.S. and other countries."
recommended an overhaul of an international judicial cooperation statute that had
never been especially useful.59 As amended in 1964, the statute (now codified, as
amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 1782) authorized federal district courts to assist foreign
courts, international tribunals, and foreign litigants in obtaining evidence
(documents, physical evidence, and testimony) located in the U.S. and sought for
use in judicial proceedings abroad.Y Congress also followed through on another
of the Commission's recommendations. It authorized U.S. membership in the
Hague Conference on Private International Law," the leading international
organization devoted to facilitating international judicial cooperation through
multilateral treaties. Finally, the early 1960s produced a breakthrough in state
procedural law. The 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
56 The lead in this was taken by Professor Albert Ehrenzweig. See, e.g., ALBERT
EHRENZWEIG,

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE ON AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
LAW, INCLUDING THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 7-10, 19-26 (1967); Albert Ehrenzweig, Interstate and
InternationalConflicts Law: A Pleafor Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REV. 717, 724 (1957) (criticizing the
use of concepts developed by courts primarily to suit the "exigencies of interstate relations" with the result
of "burdenling] international conflicts law"); compare Albert Ehrenzweig, Recognition of Custody
DecreesRenderedAbroad,2 AM. J. COMP. L. 167 (1953) with Albert Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition
of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REV. 345 (1953); see also Peter Hay, InternationalVersus Interstate
Conflicts of Law in the United States, 35 RABELSZ 429, 430 (1971) ("International cases present factual
aspects and policy considerations which are, indeed, or potentially may be, different from those relevant in
domestic (interstate) cases"); Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and InternationalDistinctions in Conflict of
Laws in the United States, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1599-1600 (1966) ("To apply mechanically a rule developed
in interstate cases to an international situation without a consideration of its policy relevance is both wrong
and dangerous."). For a precursor to these works, see Armand B. Du Bois, The Significance in Conflict of
Laws ofthe DistinctionBetween Interstate andInternationalTransactions, 17 MINN. L. REV. 361 (1933).
57 See generally Harry L. Jones, InternationalJudicialAssistance: ProceduralChaosand a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 556-59 (1953) (arguing in favor of federal legislation to cure multiple
deficiencies in the ability of U.S. courts to cooperate with foreign legal systems). Jones later served as
chairman of the Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure from 1958 to 1966. See
text accompanying note 58, infra.
58 See Act of Sep. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 248 (2004).
59 See Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (assistance limited to ordering
testimony of
person located in the forum and only where request originated from the court of a foreign country); 542
U.S. at 248 (discussing 1948 amendments eliminating requirement that the government of a foreign
country be a party or have an interest in the proceeding).
60 See Pub. L. 88-619, 78 Stat. 995 (1964); S. Rep. 88-1580 (1964) reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3782. The 1964 changes enabled federal courts to assist in obtaining not only testimony but also
documents and other tangible evidence. In addition, district courts were authorized to assist in proceedings
before foreign investigating magistrates and administrative decision-makers rather than only courts. Third,
the 1964 amendments permitted U.S. courts to respond to requests not only from tribunals and litigants but
also from any "interested person."
61 See Act of Dec. 30, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-244, 77 Stat. 775.
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(the "UFMJRA")62 was a step forward in standardizing the diverse approaches of
fifty different states with respect to recognizing the civil judgments of courts in
other countries.
Though all of these developments were important steps away from
isolationism and unilateralism, 63 none expressly addressed the longstanding
tendency of American courts, both in applying doctrine and in constructing
broader intellectual frameworks, to treat the transnational and the interstate alike.
Even after the first post-War wave of treaties and statutes authorized U.S. courts
to engage in international judicial cooperation, American courts, with a few
exceptions, 46 continued to regard domestic interstate procedural law as the model.
This first post-War effort to bring American procedural law into a more
transnational era brought mixed results. The Commission created in 1958 was
hampered by uncertain support from Congress.65 One of its main initiatives, the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedures Act ("UIIPA") was enacted by
few states.66 At the Hague Conference, the U.S. delegation pursued something less
than an internationalist agenda as it brought federalism concerns along with it67
and showed little willingness to use the cover of multilateral negotiations as an
opportunity to reevaluate domestic idiosyncrasies. 6 The judicial response to the
Hague Conventions was lukewarm. And the two key initiatives in state uniform
62 13 U.L.A. 139 (2002 ed. and 2006 Supp.). The
UFMJRA was the work of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL").
63 See Jones, supra note 57, at 538 ("[N]o other government
permits such widespread confusion and
such profound disregard for the concept of comity"); see also id. at 539 (commenting on failure of U.S.
executive departments to provide assistance commonly provided by other countries).
64 See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,
407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (declining to extend an interstate
precedent on the unenforceability of forum selection clauses to a transnational case); United States v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Great care and reserve should be
exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.").
65 Congress failed to provide all the funding
that had been promised and also set a very short period
of time for the Commission to carry out its work. See Hans Smit, The Interstate and International
ProceduresAct Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: A New
Era Commences, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 (1962).
66 It was enacted in only five U.S. jurisdictions.
See National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), Interstate Depositions and Discovery of Documents Act, July 2006
Draft, at Pref. Note 1, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/iddda/2006am draft.txt.
NCCUSL withdrew the UIIPA in 1977. In some states, however, the UIIPA was an influential source for
drafting longarm statutes and procedural rules. See R. Doak Bishop, InternationalLitigation in Texas:
Texas Rules of Evidence and Recent Changes in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,36 BAYLOR L. REV.
131 (1984).
67 Constraints imposed by federalism were
given as the reason for the U.S. declining to sign the
Bustamante Code produced by the Havana Conference of 1928 and for not becoming a member of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law until the 1960s. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, The United
Statesand the Hague Conference on PrivateInternationalLaw, I AM. J. COMP. L. 268 (1952); JAMES B.
SCOTT, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES, 1889-1928, at 371 (1931).
68 In recent years, Professor Clermont has
advanced this perspective on how the United States should
approach multilateral negotiations regarding ajurisdiction and judgments treaty under the auspices of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law. See Kevin M. Clermont, JurisdictionalSalvation and the
Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 89 (1999) (arguing that the Hague negotiations would "hand
[U.S.] lawmakers a... benefit in providing the opportunity to untangle the jurisdictional law applied at
home"). Back in the 1960s, however, the U.S. delegation negotiating the Hague Evidence Convention did
not seek to harmonize U.S. discovery practices in transnational cases with the practices of other countries.
Rather, the goal pursued was to make foreign legal systems more receptive to the existing U.S. pretrial
discovery model. See S. EXEC. DOC. C, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. at 21 (1967) ("The most significant aspect
of the [Hague Service] convention is the fact that it requires so little change in the present procedures in
the United States, yet at the same time requires such major changes, in the direction of modern and
efficient procedures, in the present practices of many other states.").
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laws, the UIIPA and the UFMJRA, actually were steps backward in one key
respect; both tended to reinforce the traditional equivalence of the interstate and
the international. Key premises of the UIIPA were that the same long-arm statute
should apply to both domestic and foreign defendants (§ 1.03), that interstate and
international judicial assistance were essentially similar (§3.02), and that the
procedures for determining the laws of entities other than the forum state (whether
the law of a foreign country or of a sister state) should be the same (§4.02). A
central feature of the UFMJRA was that a foreign-country judgment satisfying
certain minimum requirements should be treated as fully equivalent to a sisterstate judgment."
In short, this first wave of post-War procedural transnationalism reveals
missed opportunities. State lawmakers standardized long-arm statutes in the
aftermath of InternationalShoe70 but hardly gave thought to writing two sets of
long-arm statutes, one for domestic non-residents and one for foreign nonresidents. There was also the opportunity, in the context of negotiating the
Hague Evidence Convention, to reevaluate the American model of pretrial
discovery, at least in cases in which the interests of foreign countries were
implicated. That did not happen either. What did happen was the development of
a unilateral U.S. approach toward addressing differences in procedural law. Thus
the UFMJRA, which extended recognition to foreign judgments without the
requirement of reciprocity, functioned as a substitute for judgment-recognition
treaties, which might have required comparative law analysis and compromise.
The 1964 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 were another example of unilateral
lawmaking in lieu of treaty negotiation. Like the UFMJRA, the amended § 1782
operated on the premise that the self-evident virtues of the American model
eventually would be emulated by other legal systems.

B.

The Second Wave ofAmerican Transnationalism

Two decades elapsed before a second wave of reformers called for U.S.
courts to apply a more cosmopolitan procedural law in transnational litigation.72
69See, e.g., § 3 (stating that, with some exceptions, a "foreign judgment is enforceable
in the same
manner as the judgment of a sister-state which is entitled to full faith and credit"). Similarly, the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, completed in 1971, stated the general rule (subject to limited exceptions)
that the same principles govern choice of law in international settings and interstate settings. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10, comment c ("The rules in
the Restatement of this subject are also usually applicable to cases with elements in one or more foreign
nations. This is properly so since similar values and considerations are involved in both interstate and
international cases"). Comment d to § 10 states some "significant" differences between the two.
70International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 3410
(1945).
71 See S. Rep. No. 1580, (1964) reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3783 ("It is hoped that the

initiative taken by the United States in improving its procedures will invite foreign countries similarly to
adjust their procedures."); Hans Smit, InternationalLitigation Underthe United States Code, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 1018, 1018-19 (1965) (noting that the 1964 amendments "accentuate the great liberality with
which the United States permits the performance of foreign procedural acts within its borders" and that
these amendments reflect the hope of obtaining "more enlightened views" from other countries).
Professor Smit served as thc reporter for the U.S. Commission and Advisory Committee on International
Rules of Judicial Procedure.
72Much of their scholarship questioned the practice of applying interstate precedents to determine
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The emphasis this time was on making greater use of the methods of comparative
law to understand differences between U.S. and foreign procedural laws. It was
also an occasion to reconsider the applicability of the Due Process Clause in
functioning as a limit on legislative and judicial overreaching with respect to the
exercise of jurisdiction in transnational cases.73
This time, unlike in the 1960s, the arguments of those advocating more
circumspection in the application of domestic procedural approaches to
transnational fact patterns were reinforced by visible changes in the profession.
Overseas offices of U.S. law firms had become more than post-office boxes."
The overseas presence of these firms was expanding as U.S.-trained lawyers
flocked to practice areas that had long been marginal for Americans: international
arbitration, European Union regulatory law, trade disputes, managing parallel
litigation for corporate clients with interests around the world. For the first time,
U.S. law firms were employing foreign-trained lawyers in substantial numbers in
order to provide sophisticated advice on worldwide forum selection, parallel
litigation, preliminary relief, and judgment enforcement. Law schools in the U.S.
were adding new international and comparative law courses to the curriculum: EU
law, international environmental law, international intellectual property law, and
transnational litigation.
The U.S. legal system again seemed poised for a transformation, a shift
from a primarily inward-looking posture to one more engaged with the wider
world. Though the initiatives launched in the late 1950s and early 1960s had
reached only partial fruition, in the early 1990s there was reason to believe that
the transformation would be more complete the second time around. Each year,
the U.S. economy was becoming more dependent on imports and exports.75
American law students were being exposed to international and foreign law in
record numbers.76 Changes in global economic power meant that U.S. parties to
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over alien defendants comports with due process. See Gary
B. Born, Reflections on JudicialJurisdictionin InternationalCases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. I(1987);
Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over InternationalDefendants: Critical Comments on
Burnham v. Superior Court, 1990 ILL. L. REV. 593 (1990); Mary Kay Kane and Ronan E. Degnan, The
Exercise ofJurisdictionOver and Enforcement ofJudgments AgainstAlien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L. J.
799 (1988); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85
(1983); Janice Toran, Federalism,PersonalJurisdiction,andAliens, 58 TUL. L. REV. 758 (1984).
73Both emphases are apparent, for example, in the most recent
version of the Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which takes the position that international law, rather than
U.S. constitutional law, is sometimes the more appropriate constraint on carrying over what U.S. courts do
in interstate matters to what they do in transnational matters. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (international
law limitations on Congress's legislative jurisdiction); § 421 (1987) (emphasizing international law
limitations, rather than constitutional limitations, on the adjudicative jurisdiction of U.S. courts); § 421,
comment e (adjudicative jurisdiction based on transient presence, permissible as to domestic defendants,
"is not generally acceptable under international law" as to foreign defendants).
74 See London Branches, DoublingDown, AMERICAN
LAWYER, May 2001, at 21 (providing data on
the growth in size of London offices of major U.S. law firms); Carole Silver, Globalization and the U.S.
Market in Legal Services-Shifting Identities, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1093, 1100-29 (2000)
(chronicling the foreign office expansion activities of seventy-two of the largest, most internationallyoriented U.S. firms); Steven Greenhouse, US. Lawyers Flock to Brussels, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1991, at
D 1;Stephen Labaton, U.S. Law Firms Expand To Reach Global Clientele, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1988, at
Al.

75 See Christopher L. Bach, Annual Revision of the U.S.
Annual Accounts, 1989-2003, SURVEY OF
CURRENT BUSINESS 52 (July 2004).
76 Compare JOHN KING GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE 1990S (1992) with
RICHARD W. EDWARDS JR., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: A SURVEY OF TEACHING IN AMERICAN
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transborder transactions could not routinely dictate the choice of forum as they
had done a generation earlier. In tandem with these changes, a new literature
appeared, proclaiming that a new field, transnational litigation, had arrived.
IV. TRANSNATIONALISM AND THE AMERICAN BENCH

This second wave of transnationalism has touched every corner of the
American legal profession, but its impact has been uneven. In the academy, signs
of its impact are everywhere: the "global law school" model," the comparative
and international orientation of the current generation of conflict of laws case
books,"8 the marked increase in the number of foreign LL.M. programs at U.S. law
schools, and the number of established scholars who have launched second
7 9
careers by turning to comparative and transnational aspects of their specialties
Among the bar, also, transnationalism has gained traction. U.S.-trained lawyers
across a range of practice areas have learned to think not only in terms of federal
and state regulatory standards but in terms of global and regional regulation. No
highly regarded mergers and acquisitions lawyer today considers pre-merger
clearance by the U.S. Department of Justice without also considering the EU
0
merger regulation and the enforcement policies of the European Commission."
No competent lawyer drafting contracts for transnational deals approaches the
issue of forum selection without considering international arbitration and the
worldwide options for preliminary relief.
Transnationalism, however, has had less impact on the American bench.
Though litigation involving foreign parties has become common, judicial opinions
continue to operate on transnational legal problems with domestic instruments,
and they do so whether the task at hand is statutory interpretation or treaty
interpretation. Consider the Supreme Court's interpretation of a treaty that was a
centerpiece of the first wave of transnationalism in the 1960s. The majority
LAW SCHOOLS 1963-64 (1965).
77 The "global law school" model-semi-permanent visiting foreign faculty, student fellowships,
visiting doctoral researchers, clerkships on foreign courts-got off the ground at the New York University
See Hauser Global Law Scholars Program "About Us" Page,
School of Law in 1994.
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/aboutus/aboutus.htm, last visited February 26, 2008. Since then, other law
schools have implemented aspects of the model. See, e.g., Isaak Dore, The InternationalLaw Programat
Saint Louis University, 46 J. LEG. ED. 336 (1996); Diane Penneys Edelman, It Began at Brooklyn:
Expanding Boundariesfor First-Year Law Students by Internationalizingthe Legal Writing Curriculum,
27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 415 (2002); Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges to
Legal Educationand the WCL Experience,47 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 815 (2002); Santa Clara University
International Law Program, http://www.scu.edu/law/intemational, last visited February 26, 2008.
78 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY, AND LARRY KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 727-828 (6th ed. 2001) (chapter on "International Conflicts"); GARY J.
SIMSON, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2005) at
297-344 (chapter on "Recognition of Interstate and International Needs"), xxi (supplemental table of
contents listing "international conflicts cases"); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY COLLINS PURDUE, AND
ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL: CASES AND

MATERIALS (2d ed. 2003) at 6-12 (history of choice-of-law doctrine in Europe), 537-87 ("Choice of Law
in the International Arena"), 675-709 ("Jurisdiction in International Cases"), 811-855 ("Recognition of
Foreign Country Judgments").
79 Examples include Norman Dorsen (constitutional law and freedom of expression),
Alan
Farnsworth (contracts), Geoffrey Hazard (civil procedure). Mark Tushnet (constitutional law).
80 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 implementing Council
Regulation (EC) No
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, L133/1 O.J. (Apr. 7, 2004).
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opinion in A~rospatiale8' greatly limited the importance of the Hague Evidence
Convention82 for lawyers conducting transnational discovery practice connected
with U.S. proceedings. Under Justice Stevens's approach, litigants in U.S.
proceedings seeking evidence located outside the U.S. need not presumptively
first avail themselves of the convention's procedures before pursuing unilateral
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, whether such
litigants ever need to pursue the treaty route rests in the discretion of the district
court.8" Twenty years of lower court application of Arospatialehas shown that
the relevance of the Hague Evidence Convention to U.S. litigants is largely
limited to instances in which documents are in the possession of a person or entity
that is beyond the personal jurisdiction of the U.S. court or where testimony is
sought from someone beyond a U.S. court's subpoena power."
Much has been written on whether the Supreme Court got it right in
Arospatiale. In the present context, what is most noteworthy about the case is
that the Court approached the interpretation of a multilateral treaty as if it were a
wholly domestic source of law.8" In its search for intent, the majority repeatedly
refers to the views of the U.S. executive branch and regulatory agencies, 86 and
statements by U.S. negotiators87 suggesting that the U.S. delegation regarded the
treaty as merely supplementing national discovery mechanisms. Thus, in many
ways A rospatiale'streatment of the Hague Evidence Convention resembles the
manner in which courts treat legislative history when interpreting domestic
statutes; the focus is on statements made by specific U.S. actors in the drafting
and voting process rather than on the overall object and purpose of the treaty" as
Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. District
Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commericial Matters, done Mar. 18,
1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, enteredintoforcefor the United States Oct. 7, 1972. Like many
of the treaties produced by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the Convention creates
mechanisms by which courts or authorities in one member state provide assistance to courts or litigants in
another.
At present 44 countries are parties to the Hague Evidence Convention.
See
http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act-conventions.status&cid=82, last visited Feb. 26, 2008.
83 In Adrospatiale, the Supreme Court held that a
litigant's decision to avail itself of the treaty
obligations of foreign authorities is optional, presumably to be done when direct discovery is unlikely to
produce optimal results, e.g., discovery from non-parties who are domiciled abroad and who are not U.S.
citizens, or discovery in cases in which a finaljudgment from a U.S. court will need to be enforced abroad
by foreign courts which may take a dim view of the failure of U.S. litigants to pursue discovery through
the convention.
For a summary of cases and trends in the post-A&ospatiale
case law, see CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER, AND RICHARD L. MARCUS, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Civ. 2D
§2005.1 (Supp. 2008); Gary B. Born, The HagueEvidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on its Role in
U.S. Civil Procedure,57 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 77 (1994).
85 See Burbank supra note 19, at 1494. Professor
Burbank shows that in some ways the Court treated
the Convention "like an ordinary federal statute" and in other ways "failed to give [the] treaty the respect
due an ordinary federal statute." Id. at 1493-94.
86 482 U.S. at 531-32, 535 & n.19 (relying on
Presidential letter of transmittal and views of
Securities and Exchange Commission).
87 482 U.S. at 530-31 & n.13.
88 In addressing the subject of treaty interpretation, articles
31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties refer to the "object and purpose" of the treaty, "relevant rules of international law," and
the nuances created by authentication in two or more languages. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered
intoforce Jan. 27, 1980. The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention but has long taken the
position that the Convention is a codification of customary international law on principles of treaty
interpretation. See, e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301,308 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We []
treat the Vienna Convention as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties");
Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1296 n.40 ( 11 th Cir. 1999); Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361-62 (2d Cir. 1992) (referring to the position of the U.S.
81
82
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seen from the differing perspectives of the many countries that took part in

negotiations.
My concern here is not with whether Arospatiale reached the right
result. Rather, the point is that even in the most obviously transnational

cases--cases in which foreign parties are present, treaties are in play, foreign
89
governments have filed amicus briefs, and the work product of an international
9
organization is being considered -- the Supreme Court has failed clearly to
distinguish in its tools of interpretation between the transnational and the purely
domestic.
Arospatialeis not an anomaly. In the past two decades, lower federal
courts and state courts not only have failed to reflect on the ways in which
interpreting international agreements should differ from interpreting domestic
sources of law,9" they repeatedly have acted upon the view that a transnational
lawsuit is essentially a variation on a domestic lawsuit. That is, interstateinternational equivalence continues in American courts, even as the rest of the
profession struggles to come to grips with what is distinctive about transnational
law.
The remainder of this part provides three additional illustrations of this
process at work: (1) the failure of lower courts to make meaningful distinctions
between the interstate exercise of jurisdiction and the transnational exercise of
jurisdiction in applying the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Asahi v. Superior
Court;2 (2) the survival of transient presence jurisdiction over foreign defendants
based on a loose reading of Burnham v. Superior Court; and (3) the tendency of
lower courts to approach pretrial discovery in transnational cases as if it were the
same as in domestic cases.

Department of State on the status of the Vienna Convention).
89 The French government's brief argued that "civil law signatories would have had
little incentive to
agree to these American-style innovations unless the Convention defined and limited the scope of
procedures by which American litigants seek discovery abroad" and that the Convention "should not be
interpreted as if it merely gave the United States new and unilateral privileges without imposing upon it
any concomitant obligation of restraint." Brief of Republic of France as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987), at 7
and 10. The amicus brief filed by the Federal Republic of Germany asserted that "attempts to circumvent
the Convention constitute a violation of the principle that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith."
Brief of Federal Republic of Germany Supporting Petitioner, Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v.
U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987), at 7.
90 Periodically, the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law
convenes special commissions to study how various Hague conventions are functioning in practice. These
studies are based in part on an examination ofjudicial opinions in member states. The report of the 1989
special commission meeting, written shortly after the Arospatialedecision, criticized the U.S. Supreme
Court's "one sided" tendency of "concentrating on American sources." See Permanent Bureau of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Report on the Work of the Special Commission of April
1989 on the operation of the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters I & 17 (1989). The Report further observed that the
subject of the Arospatialedecision "gave rise to the most extensive discussions" of the meeting. Id.
91 For a thoughtful discussion of this failure in the realm of private international
law, see Russell J.
Weintraub, The Need for Awareness of International Standards when Constrving Multilateral
Conventions: The Arbitration,Evidence, and Service Conventions, 28 TEX. INT'L L. J.441 (1993).
92 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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Reasonableness and the Foreign Defendant: Applying Asahi

Ifjurisdiction is power, as Justice Holmes famously said,93 then the law of
personal jurisdiction ought to take into account whether power is projected across
international borders or interstate borders.
The exercise of adjudicative
jurisdiction differs in the two situations in terms of: (1) the relevance of
international law," (2) the possibility of retaliation by courts or authorities
elsewhere, (3) the potential for inconvenience and expense, (4) possible bias for
or against one or more of the litigants,95 and (5) the ability or inability of the
forum to vindicate not only its own interests but also those of other polities
bearing some connection to the dispute.96
It was not until Asahi v. Superior Court that the Supreme Court first
moved personal jurisdiction doctrine in a direction that explicitly took alienage
and foreign residence into consideration and expressly discussed differences
between the foreign non-resident defendant and the domestic non-resident
defendant. 97 In Asahi the Court held that a state court's exercise of specific
jurisdiction is subject to an overarching test of reasonableness that is separate
from the inquiry into whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of benefits
associated with having its products circulate in the forum state.98 Reasonableness,
93 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). For criticism
of the accuracy of Holmes's
statement in terms of historical practice, see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction:The "'PowerMyth " and Forum Non Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 303-04 (1956).
94 See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb.
14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal) (discussing customary
international law as imposing limits on the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts); Int'l Law Ass'n,
Comm'n on Int'l Human Rights Law & Practice, Final Report: On the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in
Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences (2000); Restatement, supra note 73, at § 421(a) (stating that
international law imposes an overall reasonableness standard that limits the power of a country, through its
courts, to exercise jurisdiction over a person or thing located outside the country).
95For recent literature examining whether foreign
litigants are a target of bias in American courts,
see Keven M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1120 (1996) (empirical study comparing the "win rates" of domestic and foreign litigants in federal
courts); Jack L. Lahr, Bias andPrejudiceAgainst Foreign Corporationsin PatentandOther Technology
Jury Trials, 2 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 405, 405 (1992) ("A widespread perception within the corporate
communities of many industrial countries holds that they will be treated unfairly in U.S. jury trials due to
the jury bias and prejudice against foreigners"); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97
NW. U.L. REV. 1497 (2003) (finding anti-foreigner bias in U.S. patent litigation); David Wippman,
Dispute Resolution, 7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 93, 94-95 (1992) (discussing apparent bias against Latin American
bank in Texas state court).
96 Imagine that an allegedly defective component
of an automobile causes injury in Florida.
Suppose, further, that courts in Florida lack jurisdiction over the defendant. Now imagine two variations
on this hypothetical case: In the first variation, the part was manufactured in Alabama by a defendant who
is subject to jurisdiction in Alabama. In the second variation, the part was manufactured in Taiwan by a
defendant who is subject to jurisdiction in the courts of Taiwan. In some sense both available forums Alabama and Taiwan - fall short of Florida in terms of their competence in applying Florida tort law and
in vindicating Florida's interest in protecting and compensating Florida citizens. But it might be thought
that the courts of a sister state (Alabama) come closer in this regard than those of a foreign country.
97Asahi was decided in the same year as Airospatialeand
in the same year that saw publication of
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law. The year 1987 also marked the publication of a law
review article by Gary Born that was in some ways a precursor to InternationalCivil Litigation in U.S.
Courts. See Born, supra note 72.
98There is considerable variation among lower federal
courts and state courts on how the purposeful
availment and reasonableness prongs of the Asahi opinion have been articulated. See, e.g., Juelich v.
Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W. 2d 565, 570-71 (Minn. 2004) (articulating a five-factor
variation on Asahi and stating that the "reasonableness prong of the due process inquiry evokes a sliding
scale: the weaker the plaintiffs showing on [minimum contacts], the less a defendant need show in terms
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according to the Court, has to be demonstrated even when the defendant's
products allegedly cause harm in the forum state.99 Thus, in Asahi the exercise of
jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer of a component part was unreasonable
because the burdens on such a defendant when forced to litigate in California
were large and the interests of California in adjudicating a third-party claim to
which no U.S. litigant was a party were small."9
Asahi is the only instance in which a Supreme Court majority, writing on
the issue of personal jurisdiction, has drawn lines distinguishing transnational
litigation from interstate litigation." °' Under Part 11(B) of Justice O'Connor's

opinion--the portion in which she wrote for an eight-justice majority''--due
process entails more than showing that the defendant purposefully directed its

behavior at the forum and more than demonstrating a bare minimum of contacts
between the defendant and the forum. Justice O'Connor's opinion first reiterated
five factors to be considered in all cases (domestic and international) potentially
bearing on whether litigation in the forum is reasonable. 03 It then emphasized
three considerations in particular that would help courts identify instances in
which the assessment of reasonableness might be different for foreign nonresident defendants than for domestic non-resident defendants. These three
transnational reasonableness factors are: (1) the "procedural and substantive
policies of other nations whose interests would be affected by the assertion of
jurisdiction,"'" ° (2) the "unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself
in a foreign legal system,' ' 0 5 and (3) the effects of adjudicating such a case on the
foreign relations policies of the United States.''
When legal scholars refer to Justice O'Connor as an internationalist,' 7
often it is her enumeration of these three factors in Asahi that prompts that

of unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction.").
99 A lack of reasonableness is characterized as a failure "to comport with traditional
notions of fair
play and substantial justice." 480 U.S. at 113, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463 (1940).
100Asahi began as a multiparty suit involving a product-liability claim by an injured
California
citizen against the Taiwanese manufacturer of a motorcycle tire tube with a third-party claim against the
Japanese component-part maker that had manufactured the tube's valve. Once the California plaintiff
reached a settlement with the tube manufacturer, the only claim remaining in the case was the third-party
indemnification claim between the two foreign manufacturers. See 480 U.S. at 113-15.
101In previous cases, the Supreme Court had adjudicated questions of
personal jurisdiction in a
transnational context without explicit reference to differences between domestic and transnational
litigation. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionale de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (general
jurisdiction); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)
(specific jurisdiction).
102 Justice Scalia did not join in that part of the opinion. Part II(A) of Justice O'Connor's opinion,
the part addressing stream of commerce and purposeful availment, commanded only four votes.
103 These factors include: the burden on the defendant; the
interests of the forum state; the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining relief; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies; and the shared interests of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies,
480 U.S. at 113-16, citing World-Wide Volkwagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
104 480 U.S. at 115 (emphasis in original).
105Id.
106Id.

107 See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unifit For Globetrotting,28 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1027,

1037 (1995); Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism'sMultiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1564, n.10 (2006).
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But there was more to Asahi than its multifactored
characterization.' °8
reasonableness test. Other facets of the O'Connor opinion caused one to think

that the case might be a watershed in terms of the American approach to
transnationalism. The overall tone of the opinion was cautionary. The opinion
observed that purposeful behavior by the defendant directed at the forum state is

not in all cases a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.'"
Consideration had to be given to the "international context, "0a point underlined
by a reference to Justice Harlan's dissent in FirstNational City Bank.. and by the
open-endedness of Justice O'Connor's formulation. Both suggested that the new

transnational approach to procedural law was a work in progress, "2that the Court
would provide further elaboration in subsequent cases, after lower courts had
wrestled with what the Court had said thus far."' Lower courts were to be vigilant
in spotting ways in which the position of foreign defendants was meaningfully
different from that of domestic defendants. They were to do their best with the
skeletal framework set out in Asahi. They were to function as experimental
laboratories until the Supreme Court was ready to say more. Perhaps, when the
Court did say more, it would discuss the meaning of reasonableness not only in
relation to personal jurisdiction but also with respect to a range of other aspects of
procedural law. In short, the central message of Part II(B) of Asahi seemed to be
that InternationalShoe and its progeny were to be applied with subtlety and

cosmopolitanism.
108

Justice O'Connor also earned that reputation by her participation in public forums on

international and comparative law, her support for judicial education programs in the area of international
law, and her qualified willingness to consider international and foreign law in interpreting certain sources
of U.S. law, including the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Dedication of the EricE.
Hotung InternationalLaw CenterBuilding: Keynote Address, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 651 (2004); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Keynote Address: Proceedingsof the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of
InternationalLaw, 96 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 348 (2002); Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalismof Free
Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 35 (1996).
109 See 480 U.S. at 108-12.
10 Id. at 116.
III United

States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) ("Great care and reserve
should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.").
112 Much about Asahi was unclear. In the absence of a Supreme Court majority on the stream-ofcommerce prong, state courts and lower federal courts have not reached a consensus on this issue. See
IMO Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing disagreement among circuit courts of
appeals). State courts have come to conflicting conclusions as to when to apply Asahi's reasonableness
analysis. Compare Bordelon v. Denhert, 770 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 2000) (applying reasonableness prong
in dicta as a check on transient presence jurisdiction in interstate case) with In re Gonzalez, 993 S.W. 2d
147 (Tex. App. 1999) (upholding, without reasonableness check, jurisdiction based on defendant's
presence within state during time that plane was refueling while en route from Colorado to Mexico). For
criticism that Asahi failed to consider international law limits on the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction,
see Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the InternationalLaw of Personal
Jurisdictionin Domestic Courts,36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373, 386 (1995); Russell J. Weintraub, Asahi Sends
PersonalJurisdictionDown the Tubes, 23 TEX. INT'L L. J. 55, 65 (1988).
113 See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Jurisdiction--Fourteenth
Amendment--Due ProcessReasonablenessof
Exercise ofJurisdiction-"Stream-of
Commerce " Theory as BasisforAssertion of PersonalJurisdiction
over Foreign Manufacturer, 81 AM J. INT'L L. 656, 658 (1987) ("Given the increased volume of
international trade and of litigation against foreign parties, the Court will certainly face this issue again.").
There were several bases for expecting that the Court would return to this area of law before long: The
reasonableness prong was imprecisely formulated. The Court's new willingness to draw distinctions
between the foreign and the domestic in matters of procedure left one to wonder whether this principle
should be extended beyond the law of personal jurisdiction to other procedural questions. The Court had
just visited the increasingly complex law of personal jurisdiction nearly a dozen times in the span of a
decade; why would it go to such lengths to micro-manage this area of law, introduce a new take on the
subject, and then leave lower courts to wander about in the new terrain without supervision?
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In large part, these expectations have not been fulfilled. Asahi has had
some influence on whether and how American courts differentiate the position of
foreign defendants from that of domestic defendants, but that impact has been
marginal. With some exceptions,' 4 lower federal courts and state courts have not
probed the comparison in a thoughtful way. Their application of Asahi's
reasonableness prong often has been perfunctory. Their focus has been on
superficial differences and similarities between domestic and alien defendants and
not on fundamental ones.
A large proportion of the lower-court case law falls into one or more of
the following categories: (1) the court relies on a strong presumption against a
defendant claiming that the assertion of jurisdiction is unreasonable;" 5 (2) the
court focuses on the physical distance between the forum and where the defendant
is located, resulting in a "you-know-it-when-you-see-it" test for when a
geographical distance is unreasonably far; ,6 (3) the court understates the burden
on the defendant either by concentrating on linguistic ability or what it sees as a
similarity between the U.S. legal system and that of the defendant's preferred
forum;' 7 (4) the court single-mindedly points to the forum state's interest in
114

See, e.g., In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litigation 320 F. Supp. 2d 204, 231

(D.N.J. 2004) ("It would be hard to find a case where the procedural and substantive policies of another
country would be more affected by the assertion of state jurisdiction than this case."); Simon v. Philip
Morris, Inc. 86 F. Supp. 2d 95 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (weighing the interests of New York, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union, investigating British law, and taking into account the worldwide res
judicata effects of ajudgment in New York); General Motors Corp. v. lgnacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F.
Supp. 656, 667-68 (E.D.Mich. 1996) (taking into account whether a RICO action in a U.S. court would be
deemed to be contrary to German public policy); F. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Superior Court, 130 Cal.
App. 4th 782, 805, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 425 (Cal.App. 2005) (coordinated efforts by global drug
companies to gather and report information on drug safety "should not result in a court's exercise of
jurisdiction over a foreign parent or affiliated pharmaceutical company").
115 See, e.g., Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1995); Southern
Systems, Inc. v. Torrid
Oven, Ltd., 58 F. Supp. 2d 843, 8512 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). Although Asahi did say that when minimum
contacts have been established "often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of
jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant," 480 U.S. at 114, it did not
articulate a seemingly unshakeable presumption, as these cases do.
116 Sometimes this
distance supports a finding that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable. See, e.g., Outokumpu Engineering Enterprises, Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviro Power, Inc., 685
A.2d 724, 732 (Del. Super. 1996) ("Even in the jet, fax, e-mail, internet and overnight delivery age, a case
with international implications should cause this Court to pause before imposing its jurisdiction."); Lichon
v. Aceto Chemical Co., Ltd, 182 111.App. 3d 672, 685 (1st Dist. 1989) (characterizing the distance
between England and Illinois as "vast" and thus supporting a finding of an unreasonable burden on the
defendant). More often, the potential burden associated with a large geographic distance is found to be
manageable because of modem forms of communications and transportation. See, e.g., Pro Axess, Inc. v.
Orlux Distribution, Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[Defendant's] headquarters in France is a
substantial distance from Utah, but ... [its] employees and its agents travel to and operate in the United
States to conduct economic activity, minimizing concerns about the burden"); Aristech Chemical Intern.
Ltd. v. Acrylic Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624,628 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Simply stated, the distance between
Ontario and Kentucky is not overly burdensome."); Ensign-Bickford Co. v. ICI Explosives USA Inc., 817
F.Supp. 1018, 1031 (D.Conn. 1993) (denying motion to dismiss based on "relatively short distance" from
Ontario, Canada to Connecticut"); In re Teknek, LLC, 354 B.R. 181, 204 (Bkrtcy. N.D.I. 2006) ("The
whole concept of a burden is not what it was when the doctrine was born, either, due to advances in
modern communication, travel, and the use of local counsel."). For additional cases, see Parrish, supra
note 46, at 23, n. 112-14 (2006).
17 Canadian defendants are especially at risk of losing
the reasonableness prong based on the view
that there is little burden in their being required to litigate in a foreign legal system that is "rooted in the
same common law tradition." See Aristech Chemical Intern. Ltd. v. Acrylic Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d
624, 628 (6th Cir. 1998); Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1462 (6th Cir. 1991). Courts advancing
this reasoning fail to acknowledge that there are important differences in procedural law between Canada
and the United States and that similarities between Canada and the United States cut both ways; they not
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providing a judicial forum in which an injury can be vindicated;" 8 (5) the court
either ignores Asahi's three transnational factors or incorporates additional
variables in its jurisdictional reasonableness analysis so that the inquiry morphs
into something resembling a forum non conveniens analysis." 9
Collectively, these permutations orient the analysis toward factors that are
relatively easy to identify and quantify, or at least appear that way. State and
lower federal courts fix upon the burden on the litigants, usually the burden on the
defendant, and the seemingly strong interests of the forum. Little attention is
devoted to the rest of the O'Connor analysis--the effects that the exercise of
jurisdiction likely will have on the procedural and substantive policies of other
nations and on U.S. foreign relations. When carrying out the inquiries prescribed
by Asahi, lower courts do little in the way of comparative law analysis in order to
get a better handle on what the respective burdens really are, on what the policies
of other nations may be, and on what the impact on U.S. foreign relations is likely
to be. In reading the post-Asahi case law, one gets the impression that the
differences between domestic litigation and transnational litigation are regarded as
differences of degree and not differences in kind. At the extreme, some lowercourt opinions suggest that technology is the solution to the complexities of
disputes that sprawl across national boundaries and that the answer to multi-

only decrease the burden for the defendant in litigating in the U.S., they also decrease the plaintiffs
interest in litigating in the U.S. rather than Canada. For cases inquiring into the facility of the defendant or
of witnesses with the English language but saying nothing about the plaintiff's facility with languages
other than English, see, e.g., Fortis Corporate Ins. v. Viken Ship Management, 450 F.3d 214, 223 (6th Cir.
2006); Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux Distrib. Inc. 428 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2005); Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts,
303 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002); Metro-MayerStudios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F.Supp. 2d 1073,
1093 (C.D.Cal. 2003).
118 Asahi warned against "find[ing] the serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal
interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum state." 480 U.S. at 115. Notwithstanding this caution,
lower courts have strayed in two respects. First, they overstate the forum's interest. See, e.g., Southern
Systems, Inc. v. Torrid Oven, Ltd., 58 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tenn, 1999); (whenever a Tennessee
resident alleges breach of contract, the forum has a strong interest in providing a forum); Apollo Tech.
Corp. v. Centrosphere, 805 F. Supp. 1157, 1187 (D. N.J. 1992) (upholding personal jurisdiction over
Philippine agent in breach of contract action because any recovery by a plaintiff who resides in the forum
"benefits the forum state"). Second, they fail to give fair-minded consideration to whether the interests of
the plaintiff and the forum can be vindicated by tribunals elsewhere. An egregious example of this is
General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortia,948 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Mich 1996), in which the
district court recited a list of the shortcomings of German procedural law, particularly in regards to pretrial
discovery, as supporting GM's right to litigate a claim for theft of trade secrets in its home court. Id. at
667-68. Such cases fail to grapple with Supreme Court precedents finding that foreign courts and arbitral
tribunals can be relied upon to provide due process to U.S. litigants. See Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (upholding arbitration agreement with respect to U.S.
antitrust claims based in part on "respect for capacity of foreign and transnational tribunals"); Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (establishing general rule that judgments of foreign courts will be recognized
in the U.S. notwithstanding differences in procedural law between foreign system and U.S.).
19 For cases in the former category, see, e.g., Sloss Industries
Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 93334 (11 th Cir. 2007); Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 631 (11 th Cir. 1996) (misstating
the Asahi framework by failing even to mention the procedural and substantive policies of Canada or the
effects of adjudicating the case on U.S.-Canadian relations). For cases of the forum non conveniens
variety, see, e.g., Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Nay. Co., Inc., I F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1993)
(mistakenly stating that a plaintiff resisting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction must
demonstrate the unavailability of an alternative forum); Andersen v. Sportmart, Inc., 57 F.Supp. 2d 651,
661 (N.D. Ind., 1999) (exercise of jurisdiction over Taiwanese distributor by federal court in Indiana is
unreasonable because "minimum contacts are more strongly established in New Jersey"); DeMoss v. City
Market, Inc., 762 F.Supp. 913,920 (D. Utah 1991) ("[P]laintiffresides in Utah and many of the witnesses
and much of the evidence is located here"); Moni Pulo Ltd. v. Trutec Oil and Gas, Inc., 130 S.W.3d 170,
181 (Tex.App. 2003) ("Asking Texas jurors to decide such matters [the effect of colonial treaties on an
African boundary dispute] places them in an untenable position.").
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jurisdictional complexity is to harness the internet to transport documents and
conduct low cost videoconferences.' 2
Not all post-Asahi decisions trivialize the differences between
transnational and interstate litigation, but many do. 2' A concrete example shows
that so much of what goes on in lower courts misses Asahi's call for nuance and a
comparative sensibility. Consider the manner in which American courts approach
language, specifically the ability to speak and understand English in the context of
depositions, document production, and court proceedings. The typical judicial
inquiry is whether the foreign party and its employees "speak English," as if there
should be a straightforward "yes" or "no" answer to this question. But, of course,
even in the everyday use of language, mastery falls along a continuum with no
clear "pass" or "fail" markers. As one moves from casual conversation to
contentious legal proceedings, with terms of art and questioning designed to trap,
the seemingly simple question-Does she speak English?-is not so simple.'22 A
more meaningful set of queries (which do not surface in the case law or academic
literature) might touch upon both language and culture as follows: Will a witness
grasp a leading question's nuances? Will a deponent fully understand how a
deposition transcript ultimately will be used? Does a foreign resident appreciate
that litigation in the United States is an adversarial presentation of starkly
opposing positions with little room for gray? Does the foreign witness know that
the inclination to acknowledge shared responsibility for a bad outcome (common
in some societies) likely will result in dire consequences in a U.S. lawsuit?
The fact that such questions about language and cultural context are
practically never asked is a measure of just how far we are, post-Asahi, from
giving meaning to the concept of "reasonableness," even within the narrow
confines of an inquiry into jurisdiction. Imagine, for example, that a complaint is
filed in the United States against a medium-sized business based in India. If the
suit goes forward in the U.S., discovery rules will require disclosure of thousands
of internal corporate emails in pretrial discovery. What are the likely
consequences in terms of "the procedural and substantive policies of other
nations" if personal jurisdiction is upheld and disclosure of the emails is ordered?
Before one can try to answer this question, it is necessary to consider who
wrote these communications. Would an employee based in New Delhi expect that
an email written hastily today would some day be at the center of a multimilliondollar lawsuit in a U.S. court? In writing an email, would such an employee
120

See Martin

Davies,

Taking Evidence by

Videolink in International Litigation, in

INTERCONTINENTAL COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF

PETER E. NYGH (Talia Einhom and Kurt Siehr, eds., 2004).
121 To be sure, there are opinions that thoughtfully
consider the impact of adjudicative jurisdiction on
efforts to foster transnational cooperation. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Superior Court, 30
Cal.Rptr.3d 407 (Cal.App. 2005) (actions of foreign pharmaceutical company in coordinated efforts to
report information concerning drug safety "should not result in a court's exercise of jurisdiction over a
foreign parent or affiliated pharmaceutical company"); Kotera v. Daioh Intern. U.S.A. Corp., 40 P.3d 506,
520 (Or. 2002) (considering the interests of Japan and finding that the dispute "has touched Oregon, but its
origins and practical effects are rooted in Japan").
122 For a thoughtful reflection on the impact
of language on many facets of dispute resolution, see
TIBOR VARADY, LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

(2006).

For observations regarding multilingualism and other aspects of transnational practice, see Vivian
Grosswald Curran, The Role ofForeignLanguages in EducatingLawyersfor TransnationalChallenges,
23 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 779 (2005).
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exercise the circumspection of a litigation-conscious employee based in the U.S.?
If the answer to these questions is no, then an earnest attempt at "reasonableness"
might well be complicated. Should we take into account the possibility that
pretrial discovery and the presentation of proof at trial will be unbalanced? Some
foreign defendants are likely to be at a disadvantage; they may have retained
potentially damaging internal communications that a well-informed litigation
conscious domestic litigant will not even have generated. At what point is a
foreign litigant placed at so much of a procedural disadvantage by these
differences in common practice and expectations as to be unreasonably required
to litigate in the United States?
Now imagine that the Indian company loses the case because its own
internal emails (unearthed during discovery) were used effectively against it. A
plausible consequence of this loss, especially if it is one with some possibility of
recurring, is that the company will adopt document circulation and retention
policies designed to respond to the threat of future litigation in the U.S. Such a
response implicates the second of the O'Connor transnational factors--the effects
that the exercise ofjurisdiction likely will have on the procedural and substantive
policies of other nations. The manner in which foreign citizens communicate with
one another in the workplace (a workplace located in India) will be influenced by
fear of litigation in America. In fact, one can imagine that the suppression of
certain kinds of communications--4hose pertaining to safety and product testing,
for example-will run contrary to the interests and regulatory policies of India.
From the perspective of U.S. policy regarding products liability, this change in
behavior of foreign companies in response to potential litigation in the United
States can be seen as either a good or bad development. Reasonable policymakers
might disagree. The insight I wish to make here is not about the relative merits of
different tort policies or approaches to pretrial discovery. My point is more
focused; American courts confronted with scenarios such as this one do not even
acknowledge that if they rule that the emails must be produced, the ruling is quite
likely to have an impact on access to and retention of information in other
countries and the manner in which product safety is investigated and documented
by firms abroad, firms that may ship only a small percentage of their products to
the U.S. market. And the failure to identify extraterritorial effects such as these
and incorporate them into a personal jurisdiction reasonableness analysis takes
place regularly, notwithstanding Asahi's instruction that lower courts consider the
procedural and substantive policies of other countries with interests that might be
affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by a court in the U.S.
By probing beneath the surface, we discover that the relationship between
language and reasonableness is not as straightforward as the existing case law
suggests. Procedural rulings that turn on language readily implicate cultural
differences, and an assumption of parity between the domestic and the foreign
litigant in this respect can easily result in a kind of indirect regulation of
communication and access to information in other countries.
Now consider the third Asahi factor, the impact of the exercise of
jurisdiction on U.S. foreign policy. After Asahi, one might have expected to see
lower court opinions with an approach to jurisdiction that is more assertive when
enforcement of an important U.S. policy is at stake. Such cases are readily
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found. 23 One searches in vain, however, for opinions in which the approach to
jurisdiction is less assertive because the U.S. policies in play are not especially
fundamental. When confronted with disputes that implicate interests a good deal
less weighty than antitrust enforcement or combating serious bank or securities
fraud, lower courts either ignore the third Asahi factor altogether or mechanically

make reference to important U.S. policy interests even when such interests are not

self-evidently weighty. 24
1 One also searches in vain for opinions that grapple with
the fact that the Supreme Court elsewhere has ruled that the antitrust laws and the
federal securities laws can be entrusted to arbitrators. 2 ' One might think that
other cases touching upon U.S. foreign policy interests might be in safe hands

outside a U.S. forum, at least if Congress has not indicated otherwise. But during
the twenty years in which Asahi has been applied, little of this type of analysis has
been carried out-so little, in fact, as to call into question whether American
courts really have turned the corner toward treating transnational litigation as a
distinct field.
In sum, though Asahi seemed to require courts to take a serious look at
the impact of U.S. procedural rules on the litigants, the internal dynamics of other
societies, and good relations between the United States and other countries, lower
courts have been guided instead by intuition, easy-to-measure variables, and a
preoccupation with whether the defendant will be unduly burdened by having to
defend litigation in the forum. Viewed in this light, the difference between an
interstate suit and a transnational one can appear small, especially in an age in
which communication is instant and inexpensive,'2 6 the global lingua franca is
English, pretrial travel is rarely essential,127 and few suits go to trial.' 21 Ifthese
In Kensington Int'l. Ltd. v Socit6 Nationale des Petrolesdu Congo, 2006 WL
846351 (SDNY
2006), the U.S. policies identified by the court were those against money laundering and transporting
stolen goods in foreign commerce, and those embodied in the Patriot Act of 2001. See also Zurich Capital
Mkts, Inc. v. Coglianese, 388 F. Supp. 2d 847, 859 (N.D. 111.2004) (upholding jurisdiction over foreign
defendant based in part on "substantial interest" in the enforcement of the federal securities laws and
protection of investors in U.S. securities markets); Dee-K Enters, Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn., Bhd., 982 F.Supp.
1138, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1997) (referring to the "important national policy" of enforcing the federal antitrust
laws).
124 For example, in Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux Distribution,
Inc., 428 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2005), a case
in which a U.S. plaintiff sued a French defendant for breach of a distributor agreement and the defendant
claimed that no contract had been formed, the court completely glossed over the Asahi transnational
analysis in abruptly concluding that because the dispute was not governed by French law (at least not
according to Utah choice of law rules) "the exercise of jurisdiction would not affect France's policy
interests." Id. at 1280. See also Hershey Pasta Group v. Vitelli-Elvea Co. 921 F.Supp. 1344, 1351, n.9
(M.D. Pa. 1996) (because the parties failed to brief the issue, "the court will presume that there is no
substantial conflict between Turkish and American policy concerns,"); Lichon, supra note 116, at 686
(noting the court's duty, under Asahi, to exercise great care and reserve with respect to the interests of
Great Britain and the foreign relations interests of the U.S. federal government, but then failing to identify
what those interests are).
125 See Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) ("The
importance of the private damages remedy [in private antitrust actions], however, does not compel the
conclusion that it may not be sought outside an American court"); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 515-16 (1974) (upholding arbitration clause with respect to securities law claims).
126 By means of the internet, the cost of transporting
vast amounts of text and pictures is practically
zero.
127 It is technically feasible to conduct most
depositions satisfactorily by videoconference, and
various internet services offer such capability at little or no cost.
128 See Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of
Civil Trial, American College of Trial Lawyers, The
"Vanishing Trial:" the College, the Profession, the Civil Justice System, 226 F.R.D. 414, 417 (2005)
(reporting that 1.8% of cases in the federal system and 15.6% of cases in a sample of state-court systems
123
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continue to be the considerations that really matter to courts in the U.S., then it is
easier to see transnational litigation in U.S. courts as a somewhat exotic variant of
domestic interstate litigation than as an autonomous field. It takes no special
expertise to prepare an affidavit stating that Jakarta is very, very far from Chicago
or that $50 million worth of product sales in the U.S. is an awful lot. The future
of transnational litigation as a distinct field turns instead on judicial attention to
international standards of procedural law and judicial appreciation of the subtle
ways in which the choice of forum and the applicable procedural law influence
outcomes in litigation and behavior in anticipation of litigation.
B. Tag Jurisdictionand the ForeignDefendant
There is a second area of personal jurisdiction law in which the failure to
distinguish the interstate from the international is even more remarkable"transient jurisdiction" or "tag jurisdiction," a variant of personal jurisdiction
based solely on a defendant's physical presence in the forum when served with
process. Notwithstanding roots in the 17th-century European understanding of
sovereignty among nation-states,19 the principal application of these ideas in 19thcentury American courts was in interstate litigation. When a domestic defendant
domiciled in a state other than the forum was served with process while
temporarily present in the forum state, the act of service alone conferred general
jurisdiction over that defendant. 3 In the period before the wholesale arrival of
state long-arm statutes,"' tag jurisdiction was a mainstream feature of interstate
litigation. In contrast, the exercise of transient jurisdiction over foreign
defendants has always been rare, perhaps because service is more difficult to
accomplish and, once accomplished,
less likely to be followed by a judgment that
32
is easily enforced abroad.'

went to trial in 2002). It makes little sense, in evaluating reasonableness, to place much emphasis on
forecasting the burdens associated with attending a trial in the United States if a trial is unlikely to take
place.
29 See, e.g., Ulricus Huber, De Conflictu Legum, reprintedin D.J. Llewelyn
Davies, The Influence of
Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English PrivateInternationalLaw, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 65 (1937)
("Those are held to be subject to a sovereign authority who are found within its boundaries, either
permanently or temporarily."). On the influence of 17th-century Dutch thought on British and American
conceptions of jurisdiction and sovereignty, see ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF
ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-27 (1992) (describing Huber's influence on Story);
James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of JudicialJurisdiction in 19th Century
America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73 (1990).
130 Jurisdiction in such an instance is "general" becruse
the defendant can be required to defend any
claims, even those with no nexus to his or her presence within the forum at the time of service.
131 Such statutes were once premised on a fiction of consent. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352, 356-57 (1927) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute authorizing jurisdiction over nonresident motorist based on finding that "the state may declare that the use of the highway by the
nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be
served").
132 A default judgment from a state or federal
court in the U.S. can be enforced on an interstate basis,
through the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and the Full Faith and Credit statute, in any
other state or federal court in the United States, so long as the domestic court that entered the original
judgment validly exercised personal and subject matterjurisdiction. Neither thr FFC Clause nor the FFC
Statute applies to the recognition of U.S. judgments in other countries.

2008

Is TransnationalLitigation a Distinct Field? The Persistenceof
Exceptionalism in American ProceduralLaw

329

By the mid-I 980s, shortly before the Supreme Court decided a string of
'" Asahi, A&rospatiale, Alvarezlandmark transnational cases (e.g., Mitsubishi,33
Machain''), the continuing validity of tag jurisdiction as applied to foreign
defendants was in doubt. The Third Restatement squarely came out against its
validity under international law,'35 and a number of American scholars also
expressed reservations. 36 Even the purely domestic interstate use of tag
jurisdiction was thought by some to be on shaky ground: InternationalShoe had
undermined the conception of territoriality that traditionally had supported power
theories ofjurisdiction.'" Shaffer v. Heitnerhad suggested that any jurisdictional
practice, no matter how well established by history and tradition, might be found
to be unconstitutional under the new formula articulated in InternationalShoe and
its progeny.'38 A number of commentators in civil procedure and conflict of laws
predicted tag jurisdiction's demise.'39 Outside the U.S., transient jurisdiction was
on its way to becoming regarded as "exorbitant."' 40
In this context, transnational transient jurisdiction (despite its relatively
small practical importance) " ' was of uncertain validity when the Supreme Court
133 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614,615 (1985) (holding that
international comity concerns required enforcement of arbitration clause with respect to antitrust claims
even if such a clause might not be respected in a case with no transnational component).
134 U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992) (upholding
criminal jurisdiction of U.S.
federal district court to try Mexican national abducted from Mexico and brought to the U.S.).
135See RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, at § 421, comment e ("[J]urisdiction
based on service of
process on a person only transitorily in the territory of the state, is not generally acceptable under
international law").
136See, e.g., Born, supra note 72, at 35 & n. 147; Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate:
End of the Century or Beginning of the Millennium? 7 TULiJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 111 (1999); Hay, supra
note 72.
137 326 U.S. at 316 (1945) (noting that the centrality of
"de facto power over the defendant's person"
had "given way," to a modem view that "due process requires only that" a defendant "have certain
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."').
138 433 U.S. 186,211-212 (1977) (.'
[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' can be

as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of
new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage"); see also Robert
Sedler, JudicialJurisdictionand Choice of Law: The Consequences ofShaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L.REV.
1031, 1035 (1978).
139See Daniel 0. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrantfor the
Transient Rule of In
Personam Jurisdiction?25 VILL. L. REV. 38, 60-68 (1979-1980); Friedrich Juenger, JudicialJurisdiction
in the United States and the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195 (1984);
Martin Redish, DueProcess, Federalism,and PersonalJurisdiction:A TheoreticalEvaluation, 75 NW. U.
L. REV. 1112 (1981); David H. Vernon, Single-FactorBases ofIn PersonamJurisdiction:A Speculation
on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 302-305 (1978); Joseph P. Zammit,
Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS L.Q. 15, 20-24 (1978).
140 Transient jurisdiction was becoming marginalized even
in England and Ireland. In becoming
parties to the Brussels Convention in 1978, the United Kingdom and Ireland undertook a treaty obligation
not to exercise transient jurisdiction over defendants domiciled in any other EU country. See Council
Convention 78/884/EEC on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters and the Protocol of Its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, art. 4 (Oct.
9, 1978) available at http://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux06a-idx.htm.
141 In terms of frequency of use and economic impact,
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant based on transient presence in the United States is far less important than the exercise of
specific jurisdiction through state long-arm statutes or general jurisdiction by virtue of continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum. See Paul R. Dubinsky, The Reach of Doing Busines9 Jurisdictionand
TransactingBusiness JurisdictionOver Non-U.S. Individuals andEntities, 64 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
Working Document Series
(1998)
available at
PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW,
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granted certiorariin Burnham v. SuperiorCourt.4' The case involved service of
process on a New Jersey defendant while temporarily present in California.
Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice Scalia upheld the exercise of
jurisdiction, relying on original intent as applied to the Fourteenth Amendment
and on the length of time over which tag jurisdiction had been upheld by
American courts. ' In a concurring opinion with echoes of Asahi, Justice Brennan
disagreed with broad reliance on historical practice. Maintaining that presence in
the forum at the moment of service should merely create a presumption of
fairness, the Brennan concurrence insisted that all exercises ofjurisdiction, even
those with a long historical pedigree, had to comport with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. '44
Given the wholly domestic fact pattern, neither opinion broached a
number of important questions. Could foreign citizens whose presence in the
United States was temporary and unrelated to the cause of action nonetheless be
"tagged?"'45 Could such defendants, like domestic defendants, properly be
subjected to American historical practices that had, over time, come to diverge
from international norms? Or, post-Asahi, did "reasonableness" qualify all
assertions ofjurisdiction over foreign defendants?
As with Asahi, the Court has not revisited the many questions left open in
Burnham. In the eighteen years since Burnham, state and lower federal courts
have had to make their own way on transnational transient jurisdiction, with the
following options open to them: (1) investigating whether the longstanding
historical practice cited by Justice Scalia with respect to tag jurisdiction over
domestic defendants exists with respect to foreign defendants; (2) rejecting the
historical approach altogether and instead conducting case-by-case determinations
as to how reasonableness varies with nationality and residence; (3) declining to
extrapolate from either the Scalia or Brennan opinions and, instead, looking to
whether international law imposes limits on tag jurisdiction with respect to
foreign defendants.

46

State and lower federal courts have taken none of these paths.
Unanimously, they have upheld transient jurisdiction over foreign defendants,'
http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal-affairs/dubinsky.html.
142 495 U.S.
604 (1990).
143 Id. at 619 ("The short of the matter is
that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone
constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system").
1/d.at 629-30 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
145 This issue was flagged by Professor Hay immediately
after the Burnham opinion came down. See
Hay, supra note 72, at 602-03, but not addressed when the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") drafted the Uniform Family Interstate Support Act of 1996, which
"codifies" the holding of Burnham. See NCCUSL, Uniform Family Interstate Support Act of 1996, § 201,
comment, availableat http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uifsa/famsuul6.htm. This uniform act
has now been enacted in all 50 states and in the District of Columbia. For a chart with links to state
implementing legislation, see http://www.divorcesource.com/tables/familysupportact.shtml.
146 See, e.g., Strauss,
supra note 112.
147 See, e.g., First American Corp. Inc. v. Price
Waterhouse, 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding
service of subpoena on non-party U.K. partnership based on in-hand service on one of the partners while
physically present in New York); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 247 (2d Cir. 1995) (service on Bosnian
Serb leader in New York); Bourassa v. Desrochers, 938 F.2d 1056, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1991) (service of
process on Canadian citizen in Florida); Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Gutierrez, 2004 WL 3737123 (C.D.Cal.
July 13, 2004) (service of process on Nicaraguan defendant while physically present in California); In re
Gonzalez, 993 S.W. 2d 147 (Tex. App. 1999) (service of process on Mexican citizen during airplane
layover in Texas); Flores v. Melo-Palacios, 921 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.App. Corpus Christi 1996) (upholding
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and they have done so with unadorned citations to Burnham without explaining
why they believe Burnham requires this result in a transnational setting. In none
of these cases has a court acknowledged that Burnham is an interstate case,
lacking a majority opinion, and that it need not be viewed as a controlling
precedent with respect to transnational application of tag jurisdiction. Instead,
lower courts' reliance on Burnham causes one to wonder whether distinctions
between interstate application of tag jurisdiction and transnational application
have even been brought to the court's attention by counsel. The response of
lower courts to motions challenging tag jurisdiction is similar to their response to
motions challenging jurisdiction based on the reasonableness prong of Asahi. In
both instances, courts are strongly inclined to treat the transnational case as
functionally the same as the interstate case.
This nearsightedness in the post-Burnham case law is especially
noteworthy. Nothing in the Burnham opinions expressly addressed whether
foreign defendants, like domestic defendants, with no prior connection to the
forum could be subject to general jurisdiction based on transient presence in the
forum state, and nothing in either the Scalia or Brennan opinions suggested that
the Court was thinking48about potential future cases involving tag jurisdiction in a
transnational setting.1

This is especially true of the Brennan opinion, which stuck closely to the
interstate fact pattern before the Court. That opinion put forward a case-by-case
approach and said that, in most instances, the exercise of jurisdiction based on
transient presence would satisfy the test of reasonableness. But the reasons
advanced for this last conclusion do not fit transnational cases well at all. The
reasons given were that: (1) case law over many years has put potential
defendants on notice that venturing away from home entails a risk of being sued
in a distant forum; (2) the defendant receives benefits from the forum (e.g., police
protection, the "benefits of the forum state's economy") 49 while he or she is there;
(3) tag jurisdiction is not unreasonably one-sided; the defendant has the right to
file counterclaims and otherwise participate in litigation in the forum on equal
terms with citizens of the forum state; (4) the imposition on the defendant is
typically "slight;"'' 0 especially if the defendant already has expended the
resources to enter the forum voluntarily on prior occasions.
None of these arguments applies with much force to a foreign citizen who
has been served with a summons and complaint during a brief visit to the U.S.
Foreign non-residents are far less plausibly put on notice of the risks of tag
jurisdiction than are domestic defendants.' 5' A foreign visitor does indeed receive
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mexican citizen on two alternative grounds-residence in Texas and
service of process while physically present in Texas); Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837 (Tex.App.
Dallas 1991) (service of process in Texas on Lebanese citizen resident in Bahrain; jurisdiction not
contested); Schinkel v. Maxi-Holding, Inc., 30 Mass. App. 41, 45 (App. Ct. 1991) (resident of Finland
served with process in Massachusetts while on vacation).
148 The briefs filed in Burnham understandably did not
address international aspects of transient
jurisdiction; the case at bar was purely domestic.
149

495 U.S. at 637-638.

150Id. at 638-39.
151 In most countries, the practice of transient jurisdiction
is unknown. A non-lawyer visiting
Orlando for a short holiday can hardly be expected to be aware of an idiosyncratic U.S. jurisdictional
practice that departs from the international norm.
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certain benefits from a visit to the United States, but to suggest that amenability to
general jurisdiction thousands of miles from home is part of some implied quid
pro quo is far-fetched.'52 For many foreign defendants, some of the effects of tag
jurisdiction are indeed one-sided.'53 Finally, the potential burdens of defending a
suit far from home in a legal system with unfamiliar rules and timetables can
hardly be characterized as "slight." That an individual has once traveled to the
United States hardly demonstrates that being required to retain U.S. counsel and
participate in the unfamiliar processes of the American civil justice system is an
imposition that is reasonable."
Given the indications that the Supreme Court was not thinking in
transnational terms in Burnham, the lockstep manner in which lower courts have
upheld the exercise of transient jurisdiction over foreign defendants based on a
quick citation to Burnham is noteworthy.' One would be more convinced that
American courts were in fact prepared to recognize transnational litigation as a
new and separate field if they were willing to grapple with two major ways in
which foreign defendants are situated differently than domestic defendants: their
relationship to international law and their relationship to the U.S. Constitution.
On the first difference, international law has little to say about the terms
on which a court in the United States exercises adjudicatory jurisdiction over an
American citizen, whether an in-state resident or an out-of-state resident. As
invoked against domestic defendants, tag jurisdiction is solely a matter of
domestic law. For the foreign defendant, however, international law can be a
source of jurisdictional rights. The existence of such rights is most apparent in
countries that are party to treaties on jurisdiction,'56 but such rights can also be
152

A more plausible quid pro quo is that in return for police protection in Times Square, foreign

tourists inject cash into the economy of New York and the United States as a whole.
153 For example, U.S. courts carrying out a choice-of-law
inquiry are far more reluctant to apply the
law of a foreign country than the law of a sister state. See John G. Sprankling and George R. Lanyi,
PleadingandProofofForeignLaw in U.S. Courts, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L. 3, 9-11 (1983) (discussing ways
in which U.S. courts avoid having to acertain and apply foreign law).
154 Justice Brennan's discussion of factors that
bear on whether tag jurisdiction is reasonable never
refers to Asahi. There are two main differences between Asahi and Burnham that potentially explain the
absence of any mention of Asahi's reasonableness analysis by Justice Brennan in Burnham, even though
the two cases were decided within three years of one another. First, Asahi was a case about specific
jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction. Second, Burnham, on its facts, was a purely interstate case posing no
need for the Court to speculate, at least not explicitly, on the relevance of Part II(B) of Asahi on a case
presenting a transnational variation on Burnham.
155 In U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655,
660-61 (1992), decided two years after Burnham, the
Court upheld criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who had been abducted from Mexico and
physically brought before a court in Texas. The Court relied on Frisbiev. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952)
(criminal defendant abducted in Chicago and brought to Michigan for trial) and Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436 (1886) (abduction from Peru to Illinois). The Court made no effort to distinguish between the
interstate precedent (Fisbie)and the transnational one (Ker).
156 See, e.g., Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 1998 O.J. (L 304) 36 (the "Brussels Convention") (multilateral treaty among European Union
member countries that was transformed into an EU Regulation, effective as of March 2002). The United
States is not a party to the Brussels Convention but is a party to the 1958 New York Convention, which
divests national courts ofjurisdiction in instances in which the parties have agreed to submit a dispute to
arbitration. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. (11)(3)
[ 1970] 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, entered into force June 7, 1959. Recently, the United States
and 66 other countries took part in negotiations under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law to create a global treaty for enforcing choice-of-court agreements. See Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements, concluded June 30, 2005, not yet entered into force, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act-conventions. listing. Article 6 of the choice-of-court convention
mandates that courts other than the one specified in a valid choice of court agreement dismiss actions filed
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found in other sources of international law.'" Because of the dearth of U.S.
treaties relating to adjudicative jurisdiction, in a transient jurisdiction case in a
U.S. court, the key international law question is whether the exercise of
jurisdiction violates customary international law. Neither Asahi nor Burnham
probed that question, and lower courts have not done so subsequently.
As for the second difference, the domestic defendant stands before the
U.S. Constitution in a different posture than does the non-resident alien. For all
the ways in which non-citizens draw rights from the U.S. Constitution,' 8 aliens
are not part of the collective "We the People."'59 Their diminished stature has
practical implications in terms of whether transient jurisdiction is reasonable. For
the domestic defendant, the burden of defending a lawsuit in a forum with which
one has practically no connection is counterbalanced by certain constitutional and
statutory rights: the right to litigate against one's adversary on equal terms;'60 the
right to initiate an independent suit elsewhere in the U.S.; the ability to make use
of full faith and credit; 6' the protections afforded by federal venue statutes;,62 the
reassurance that important aspects of procedural law do not vary greatly from one
court in the United States to another; 61 the ability potentially to move the suit
elsewhere in the U.S.; '" and the right, if all else fails, to seek protection under
U.S. bankruptcy law.
For the foreign non-resident defendant, the strategic disadvantages of tag
jurisdiction are not mitigated to the same extent. The foreign defendant receives
no protection from federal venue statutes 6' and will find it difficult to change the
venue, especially if the plaintiff is resident in the U.S. 66 The foreign defendant
can initiate a parallel suit elsewhere in the U.S., but typically there is little to gain
with them.
157 See Congo v. Beig., supra note 94 at

l19-69 (examining national legislation, national case law,

treaties, and decisions of international tribunals for evidence of customary international law regarding
limits on the adjudicative jurisdiction of national courts).
158 See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 105-16 (First Amendment rights of aliens); GERALD
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 52-63
(1996) (discussing Alien and Sedition Acts of the Adams administration).
159 Even in those instances in which provisions of the Constitution have
been construed as conferring
rights on aliens, that interpretation is often reached with an eye on preventing detrimental spill-over effects
on U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Reno v. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,488 & n. 10
(1999) (First Amendment rights of deportable aliens); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
dissenting) ("By respecting the rights of foreign nationals, we encourage other
285 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
nations to respect the rights of our citizens.").
160 See McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934)
("The privileges and
immunities clause ... requires a state to accord to citizens of other states substantially the same right of
access to its courts as it accords to its own citizens.").
161 If the first suit is in state court and the second suit is in federal
court, there will be a strong
presumption that the second forum will neither stay nor dismiss its proceedings, see Colorado River
Constr. Dist. v. U.S. 424 U.S. 800 (1976); therefore the plaintiff will not have gained an exclusive forum
through tag jurisdiction. The first suit to be litigated to a final judgment will then have preclusive effects
with respect to the other. See U.S. Const., art. IV, §1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
162 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(a)-(d) & (g).
163 For example, the courts of all states afford the right to jury trial; all permit
pretrial discovery and
pretrial dispositive motions; and all have relatively similar laws governing litigation-related privileges.
164 If the suit initially is brought in state court, it can be removed
to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §
1441. From there, it can be moved to a federal court in another part of the country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
:5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (d) (alien may be sued "inany district").
166

See infra text accompanying note 212.
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by doing so.'67 Although the foreign defendant who is rendered insolvent by an
adverse judgment can file for bankruptcy, U.S. bankruptcy law traditionally has
not made that protection available on the same terms as for U.S. citizens and
residents. ,68

In sum, the current practice of state courts and lower federal courts in
matter-of-factly rejecting objections to tag jurisdiction by foreign defendants is an
especially vivid illustration of the continuing nature of interstate-international
equivalence by the American bench. An interstate precedent that failed to
command a Supreme Court majority has been extended by lower courts to
transnational cases. This extension has taken place despite questions as to
compliance with international law and notwithstanding the lack of indications that
the Supreme Court intended for foreign defendants and domestic defendants to be
treated alike in this respect. Finally, this extrapolation from interstate to
international has occurred with little or no analysis or explanation by the courts
doing it. 6

C. JudicialAssistance: Discovery in Aid of ForeignProceedings
Personal jurisdiction is not the only area of civil procedure in which the
approach to transnational litigation has been shaped by interstate doctrines and
frameworks. Extrapolation from the interstate to the international has also shaped
the American approach to transnational judicial cooperation, especially the pursuit
of testimony, documents, and physical evidence located in the United States and
sought in connection with a legal proceeding elsewhere. In this arena, U.S. courts
have long interacted with foreign courts as if the latter were domestic tribunals
located in another part of the United States. Recent case law shows that this
approach is still common.
As with tag jurisdiction, there is a history to this. Throughout the 1800s
and well into the 1900s, the principal avenue for securing either physical evidence
located outside the forum or the testimony of non-party witnesses was through the
assistance of other courts-either courts in sister states or foreign courts."'7 The
167 Typically, the foreign defendant wishes
to litigate the controversy in a foreign forum. A parallel
foreign proceeding, however, does not come within the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the
Full Faith and Credit Statute. Thus a judgment in such a proceeding will not necessarily have preclusive
effects on the U.S. suit that was initiated by tag jurisdiction.
168 See Atlanta Shipping Corp. v. Chemical
Bank, 631 F.Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (in order to file
for bankruptcy protection, foreign corporation must have a place of business in the U.S.); In re Levy, 221
B.R. 559, 565-67 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla. 1998) (non-resident alien cannot claim Florida homestead exemption
in U.S. bankruptcy proceedings).
169 An important qualification needs to be
made to the conclusions of this section. If personal
jurisdiction is upheld, the case can be dismissed pursuant to a forum non conveniens motion. However,
not all state court systems permit forum non conveniens dismissals. See, e.g., Vernon's Tex. Statutes and
Codes Ann., Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.051 (forum non conveniens dismissals not permitted if plaintiff
is a legal resident of Texas). In the federal courts, the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to considerable
deference if the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen or resident. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255
(1981).
170 With respect to a non-party residing outside
the territory of the forum, the forum court lacked
subpoena power over that person with respect either to testimony or physical evidence. The litigants to a
dispute, unlike non-party witnesses, could be ordered by the forum court to testify or produce evidence
under threat of sanction.
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basis on which a sister-state court might be inclined to comply with the request
was comity, 7 ' a legal principle developed by seventeenth and eighteenth-century

Europeans" '7 concerned about interactions among nation states.'73 As an imprecise
legal principle, comity found fertile soil in the U.S. after being imported by early
American jurists like Joseph Story and applied to relations among states in a

federal union.' 74
In terms of interstate discovery, it was not until widespread adoption in
the 1920s and 1930s of the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act (UFDA) that a
litigant in one forum could count on the assistance of state courts elsewhere. 7 '
Not until well after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938
did smooth and seamless pursuit of nationwide discovery in the federal courts

become a reality.'76 Similarly, judicial cooperation on an international scale was
largely consigned to the realm of comity, 77
' with all the uncertainty and delay that
might be entailed. Though one federal statute did authorize federal courts to assist
foreign courts in obtaining the testimony of persons in the United States, that
statute was so restrictive in scope as to be of little use. "' Not until the 1960s and
171 See Everett v. Bourne, 21 Or. 218,227 (1891) ("It
is true the duty may not be imposed by positive
local law, but it rests on national comity, creating a duty that no state could refuse to fulfill without
forfeiting its standing among the civilized states of the world.").
172 See generally Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity
Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 9, 20-30 (1966)
(discussing Ulrik Huber, Christian Rodenburg, Johannes Voet, and Paulus Voet).
173 A distinction needs to be made here between
interstate pretrial cooperation and post-trial

cooperation. The latter term refers to recognition and enforcement of the final judgments of sister-state
courts, a process addressed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, art. IV, § 1, and by the
Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and thus governed by obligations stronger than comity.
174 See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 79 (R. Dana 8th ed. 1866) ("There
is no obligation, recognized by legislators, public authorities, and publicists, to regard foreign laws, but
their application is admitted, only from considerations of utility and the mutual convenience of states");
STORY, supra note 51, at § 29 ("[T]he rulers of every empire from comity admit that the laws of every
people in force within its own limits, ought to have the same force everywhere, so far as they do not
prejudice the powers or rights of other governments, or of their citizens"); see generally Stewart Jay, The
Status of the La, of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REv. 819, 821-22 (1989).
175 See Everett v. Bourne, 21 Or. 218, 227 (1891) ("[I]t
is conceded that there is no statute in this
state expressly, and in so many words, conferring jurisdiction on the circuit courts of this state" to receive
letters rogatory from another state); id ("This question is one involving the comity of states, grows out of
necessity, and is recognized by the law of nations"). The Uniform Foreign Depositions Act (UFDA) was
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1920 and adopted
in 13 states before being superceded by the Uniform Interstate and International Procedures Act in 1962.
The history is summarized in the introduction to the 2007 Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery
Act, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/iddda/2007act final. Prior to 1920, some
states enacted their own judicial assistance statutes, which were precursors to the UFDA. See, e.g., Davis
v. LeHigh Valley R. Co., 97 N.J.L. 412 (1922) (interpreting New Jersey statute); Buck v. Strong, 19 Pa.
C.C. 174; 1897 WL 3366 (Pa. 1897) (interpreting Pennsylvania statute).
176 It should be noted, however, that before the
change in U.S. norms regarding pretrial discovery
brought about by the Federal Rules, the scope of all pretrial discovery, though varying from state to state,
was narrow by current standards. The occasions for seeking discoverable information from non-parties in
a state other than the forum were infrequent, in part because state and federal procedural rules did not
entitle a litigant to much in terms of pretrial discovery. The Federal Rules greatly liberalized access to
pretrial discovery in suits in federal courts. Within a generation, this aspect of the Federal Rules had an
impact on discovery practice in state courts throughout the country. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal
Rules, Local Rules, andState Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,andEmergingProceduralPatterns,137 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1999 (1989).
177 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 320 (1842) (discussing the
importance of offers of reciprocity among the courts of different countries in the context of letters rogatory
and commissions).
178 See Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630. Assistance
under this statute was limited to
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1970s were truly useful statutory and treaty mechanisms put in place for U.S.
courts to cooperate with foreign courts in making evidence available across
national borders."9 And when the new statutory and treaty-based approach did
arrive, it followed the domestic model: party-driven discovery with a minimum of
intervention by courts. In short, the overall pattern for cross-border discovery
(interstate and international) was as follows: an early period dominated by comity;
a transition to more formal duties defined by statutes, uniform acts, or treaties;
and a receptiveness on the part of U.S. courts to requests from foreign courts that
mirrored the treatment accorded sister-state courts during the same time period.
An appreciation of this last point begins by noting another practice that
seems remarkable today-use of the term "foreign" by the courts of one state in
characterizing proceedings in the courts of another state. 80 In an era in which
state citizenship mattered as much as national citizenship, this seemed
appropriate. The laws of another state, particularly one located in a different
region of the country, could seem foreign. The basic philosophy of pretrial

discovery varied from one state to another.' 8' Interstate requests for assistance,

like international requests, were pursued through letters rogatory" ' or the
appointment of commissioners,'83 and the reception accorded such requests rested
with the discretion of the receiving court."'' Until promulgation of a uniform act
in 1936,"'8 the norm was that a court in one state would not take judicial notice of
the laws of another state,' 6 a rule that reflected the reality that throughout much of
one form of evidence (testimony) and only when requested through a letter rogatory directly from a
foreign court. For a summary of the history of this statute and amendments to it, see Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247-50 (2004).
19 The United States signed the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial
Matters
in
1970
and
ratified
it
in
1972.
See
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82 (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
180 See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Doughty, 140 N.W.
627, 630 (Mich. 1913) (referring to Iowa court as a
"foreign tribunal"); The Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), drafted in
1964, uses the term "foreign" to refer to the judgment of a sister state. See UEFJA §1.
181 See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing
ExpeditionsAllowed: The HistoricalBackgroundofthe
1938 FederalDiscovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 702 - 14 (1998) (summarizing period of state
"experimentation" with regard to discovery in the early 1900s).
182 See Teidman v. The Signe,
37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (D. La. 1941).
183 See generally FRANCIS WHARTON, TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, OR PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ANGLO-AMERICAN, ROMAN, GERMAN, AND
FRENCH JURISPRUDENCE 722 (1872) (explaining the appointment of commissioners as common practice
among various nation-states). The similarity between interstate judicial assistance and international
judicial assistance changed with widespread adoption of the UFDA, which moved the former from the
realm of comity to that of statutory duty.
184 See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Doughty, 140 N.W.
627, 628 (Mich. 1913) (finding that questions raised in
interrogatories presented through letters rogatory from sister-state were not relevant); Doubt v. Pittsburgh
and Lake Erie RR Co., 19 Pa. C.C. 178, WL 3367 at *3 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1897) ("[l]t never could have been
intended to make the courts of this State the unquestioning and perhaps unwilling agents of a court of
another State."); id. at *3 ("It may be admitted that the comity of nations in this matter has the force of
law, but it still leaves to the court whose power is invoked the right to determine as to the legality and
rightfulness of its exercise."); Buck v. Strong, 19 Pa. C.C. 174, 1897 WL 3366, *2 (Pa. 1897)
(characterizing letters rogatory as "polite requests to the court of a foreign jurisdiction to cause the
witnesses to appear before that court and answer the interrogatories thereto annexed, upon the assurance of
a willingness to do the same for that court in a similar case").
185 Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Act, 9 UNIF. L. ANN. 399.
196 See In re Estate of Drumheller, 252 Iowa 1378
(196 1); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, INCLUDING THE STATUTES
§ 2558 (3d ed. 1940) ("It was generally held at common law that a foreign law is a matter of "fact"), §
2573 ("The laws of foreign nations and States-not being laws of the forum at all.... at common law
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the 1800s, accessing the current law of another state could be as difficult as
collecting legal sources from England.
Today, the story is in part different but in part the same. The difference is
that courts in the U.S. are quite forthcoming with discovery assistance, both in an

interstate context and in an international one. What remains the same is that
attitudes toward transnational discovery and transnational judicial cooperation
continue to be shaped by domestic precedents, a pattern that is apparent in the
application of the statute whose amendment in 1964 was discussed in Part II1(B)
and which is now codified as 28 U.S.C. section 1782.'87

Two aspects of the recent section 1782 case law bring this last point

home. 8' First, American courts rarely tailor their discovery orders to be
compatible with the discovery norms in the foreign legal system in which the
main action is pending.'89 Their inclination is to make available to applicants
whatever testimony and document discovery would be the norm if the main
proceeding were pending in the U.S. Second, the relationship between trial court
and appellate court in section 1782 proceedings has become modeled on the
relationship that exists in domestic discovery practice. Specifically, the same

standard of review (abuse of discretion) has been held to apply, even though such
a high degree of deference is inappropriate in the transnational context. Both of
these issues are explored in more detail below.
First, with respect to the scope of discovery and the range of persons and
entities able to obtain it, cases repeatedly affirm the ability of section 1782

requesters to obtain information through U.S. discovery procedures that is not
subject to discovery in other legal systems. In practical terms this means the

following: (1) The specific evidence that is sought need not be admissible in the
foreign legal system in which suit is pending;' 9 (2) The type of discovery

mechanism made available in the U.S. need not be one that is available in the
foreign legal system;' 9' (3) The request need not come from a foreign court or

would not be noticed."); Annotation, C.T. Dreschler, Uniform JudicialNotice of Foreign Law Act, 23
A.L.R. 2d 1437 (1952); but cf Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. 607, 625 (1835) (finding federal circuit courts,
unlike state courts, obliged to take judicial notice of laws of all states); Arthur Nussbaum, Proofof
Foreign Law in New York: A ProposedAmendment, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 348 (1957) (arguing that proof of
the law of a foreign nation may involve different procedures and problems than proof of the law of a sister
state).
187 In the last two decades, American courts
have experienced a substantial increase both in section
1782 requests and in litigation relating to those requests. See John Fellas and David Zaslowsky, Obtaining
Evidence Located in the U.S. for Use in Foreign Litigation: 28 U.S.C. §1782,756 PLI/Lit 123 (March
2007) available on Westlaw (JLR database).
188 The current version of the statute provides, in relevant part: "The district court of the district in
which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal." The statute further
authorizes district courts to order discovery pursuant to a letter rogatory, the request of a foreign or
international tribunal, or upon the application of "any interested person."
189 This perspective on the entire process of procedural
reform in relation to transnational litigation
was articulated by Harry Jones in 1953, five years before he became chairman of the Advisory Committee
created by Congress in 1958. See Jones, supra note 57, at 560 (calling for a "campaign of reciprocal
education" between the U.S. bar and the bars of civil law countries so as to better understand what aspects
of discovery and procedure each desires the other to accept).
190 See Application of Asta Medica, S.A.,
981 F.2d 1, n.6 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Letters Rogatory from
Tokyo Dist., Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976).
191 See In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 193-194
(3d Cir. 1998); In re Application of Gianoli
Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1993). Pretrial depositions, for example, are not a part of trial
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international tribunal. The foreign litigants themselves can avail themselves
directly of the fruits of section 1782 without their requests being filtered by a
foreign court;'9z (4) The applicant making the section 1782 request need not first
attempt to obtain the information through discovery mechanisms available in the
foreign legal system where the main action is pending. 93
Undesirable results may follow from U.S. courts routinely granting
foreign litigants access to information on the same scale as that which prevails
under U.S. domestic discovery norms. Wide access to documents, databases, and
non-party witnesses can substantially increase the expense of the overall
proceedings, thus causing the foreign proceedings to favor litigants with large
economic resources and litigants who are pursuing discovery rather than
providing it. U.S.-style discovery also exposes parties to new risks that may
strongly influence their decision to litigate or to settle. For example, as a result of
information obtained through discovery in the U.S., foreign litigants or thirdparties may be exposed to public scrutiny and embarrassment that would not
occur in their home countries."'
Foreign courts can take steps to protect their own proceedings from these
effects,'95 but this may be easier said than done. Not all foreign judges are
familiar enough with U.S. discovery methods to anticipate what satellite
proceedings in the U.S. entail. Those foreign courts inclined to disregard
testimony or documents obtained via section 1782 may not realize that such
testimony may never come before them because the prospect of discovery in the
U.S. creates pressures to settle the case. Moreover, foreign judges accustomed to
awarding costs and attorneys' fees to the prevailing party face several complicated
questions: Who should pay for the discovery efforts in the U.S.? The party who
ultimately prevails in the suit? The party who initiated discovery in the U.S.?
Should the large costs of discovery in the U.S. be examined with an eye toward
which avenues of permissible discovery (permissible, that is, under U.S. law)
were unnecessarily pursued? Would a foreign court unfamiliar with U.S.
discovery rules be equipped to make this last inquiry?
The second aspect of recent section 1782 case law that shows domestic
perspectives being extended to transnational litigation concerns the standard of
preparation in most other legal systems.
192 In the one instance in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute,
the court held that even
non-litigants can obtain information through section 1782 so long as the request is made by an "interested
person" with a reasonable contemplation of eventual litigation. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 259 (2004).
193 See Malev Hungarian Airlines v. United Tech. Int'l
Inc., 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992).
194 For example, discovery in the U.S. may reveal that a defendant
manufacturer produces goods in
poor countries under sub-standards conditions. Even if this fact has little relevance to the specific issues
being litigated, the liberal American approach to pretrial discovery might permit this line of inquiry
because it is designed to lead to admissible evidence. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)
("Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden ... and where production of those facts is
essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had. Such written statements and
documents might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to the existence
or location of relevant facts"); see generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE AND ARTHUR R.
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 400-02 (4th ed. 2005) (collecting lower court cases). The result might be that
the defendant is faced with a choice-settle the suit or risk great damage to brand image -a choice that it
would not face if U.S. discovery were not available.
195 For example, by enjoining the parties from making section
1782 requests in American courts or
by refusing to consider evidence obtained via such requests. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 261 (2004).
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appellate review. Every appellate court that has addressed this issue has found
that a district court's ruling in a section 1782 proceeding is subject to reversal
only for abuse of discretion. Courts of appeals reverse those lower-court
discovery rulings that are "plainly wrong"'96 and lead to "manifest injustice."'.
Given this leeway by appellate courts, there is considerable variation in the
approach to discovery taken by trial courts, not only from one circuit to another,
but even within the same circuit. Some judges limit the number of interrogatories
and the length of depositions. Some judges strongly encourage parties to work
out discovery issues on their own. Some judges are hands-on. Others rely
extensively on magistrates.'"
In domestic litigation, this abuse of discretion standard makes a good deal
of sense. The trial court, unlike the court of appeals, can more easily take account
of the entire context in which a specific discovery dispute fits and make a ruling
with the benefit of having monitored the case for months or years through status
conferences, motions, and other occasions for evaluating the intentions and good
faith of litigants and their lawyers. The court of appeals, in contrast, has only a
paper record. Often decisions with respect to discovery are made as part of a
package that reflects a trial judge's sense of overall fairness and parity. Appellate
courts are not as well positioned to judge whether the many rulings made during
discovery balance out. Also, from the viewpoint of court administration, parties
and their lawyers need to know that even subtle forms of misbehavior will lead to
bad consequences-if not formal sanctions, then the loss of the benefit of the
doubt on discovery questions and the likelihood that the trial judge's rulings on
such matters will be final. Lastly, domestic discovery rulings are not final
judgments. They are not subject to appellate review until the final judgment in
the entire case has been reached by the lower court and an appeal has been
granted. If the standard of review were more exacting than abuse of discretion, a
large proportion of final judgments might be overturned on appeal because of
erroneous discovery rulings. The result would be a system that many would find
unacceptably inefficient in terms of effort wasted on summary judgment motions
and trial time.' 99
Few of these considerations are persuasive when applied to a district
court's discovery rulings in section 1782 proceedings. With section 1782
discovery, the role of a U.S. district judge is limited. The request initiates a selfcontained legal proceeding designed to support the main suit in a foreign or
international forum. This satellite discovery litigation is typically shorter than the
discovery phase of comparable domestic litigation and certainly shorter than an
entire domestic law suit. The magistrate or district judge ruling on discovery
See Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179,
186 (1st Cir. 1989).
Id.; see also Brandt v. Wand Partners, 242 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir.
2001) (stating that the discretion of
district court judges and bankruptcy judges on matters of discovery is "very broad" and stating that
appellate courts "simply cannot manage the intricate process of discovery from a distance").
198 For an argument in favor of construing
section 1782 as granting wide discretion to district courts,
see Comment: How to Construe Section 1782: A Textual Prescriptionto Restore the Judge'sDiscretion,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1994).
199 Another likely reason for the deferential
standard of review is that if the standard were more
rigorous, the workload for appellate courts in reviewing the many discovery related decisions made by
trial courts would be considerable.
196
197
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requests does so after having learned far less about the case, the parties, and the
lawyers than trial judges do in domestic litigation, so that it is less clear than in
the domestic context that an appellate court is in a poor position to second guess
rulings made by the district court.
Wide discretion is inappropriate for a second reason. With section 1782
discovery, a district court and a U.S. jury are not the ultimate consumer of the
evidence produced; a foreign court is. The element of continuity-the same judge
supervising the case from pleading to discovery to dispositive motion to trial-is
not present. This difference matters because a district judge ruling on a summary
judgment motion in a domestic case makes that ruling aware of what avenues of
discovery were pursued, which avenues were not permitted, and the effect of its
discovery rulings on briefing at the summary judgment stage and beyond. Such is
not the case in transnational discovery under section 1782.
Third, the time frame for appellate review of section 1782 rulings differs
from that in domestic litigation. A district court's ruling in the former is a final
judgment for purposes of the final judgment rule. o Whereas in domestic
proceedings, a party unhappy with a discovery ruling must wait until the final
outcome of the entire lawsuit before obtaining appellate review of the discovery
ruling, the timing is different with section 1782 determinations. A reversal by an
appellate court will not overturn ajury verdict or the disposition of a case reached
after extensive summary judgment briefing. This difference, one that flows from
the satellite nature of 1782 proceedings, is another reason that the abuse of
discretion standard is inappropriate in transnational cases.
Fourth, the lack of uniformity produced by an abuse of discretion
standard is more problematic in the transnational context than in the domestic one.
The downside of allowing each circuit (and even each judge) great leeway is that,
to foreign litigants and foreign governments, the disparity of results can seem
unprincipled. If a request of a court or government ministry from Country X is
denied by a district judge in Nevada, and that ruling is at odds with what district
judges in New Jersey allow, Country X may take offense and even retaliate in
some way. Similar concerns inspired the Framers, Congress, and generations of
American judges to develop mechanisms for bringing about uniform application
of procedural laws as they bear upon foreign relations.2"'
Despite these differences between domestic discovery practice and
transnational discovery, the abuse of discretion standard of review has been
adopted unanimously without any appellate court having reflected on this
difference and having explained why so deferential a standard of review is
warranted in the context of transnationaljudicial assistance. Rather, the source of
the abuse of discretion standard appears to be the predominance of that standard
in nearly all aspects of domestic discovery. Appellate judges are unaccustomed to
200 See Kestrel Coal Pty. Ltd., v. Joy Global Inc., 362 F.3d 401, 403 (7th Cir. 2004); Bayer AG
v.
Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 190 n. 1(3d Cir. 1999) ("Only the discovery dispute under 28 U.S.C. § 1782
is occurring in the United States. Therefore, because the underlying litigation is in Spain, this discovery
order is immediately appealable.").
201 Among the motivations for enactment of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act was to create a
uniform federal approach to litigation involving foreign governments by shielding them from juries,
allowing immediate appellate review, and creating special rules on preliminary relief and execution of
judgments. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Star. 2891 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000)).
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exercising much supervisory authority over domestic discovery. In the context of
section 1782 discovery, they have shown little inclination to inquire deeply into
the impact of U.S.-based discovery on proceedings in foreign legal systems and
on relations with other countries.

V.

CAVEATS AND OBJECTIONS

The analysis thus far has unveiled an intellectual predisposition of
American courts, one that is rarely commented upon or challenged. When
American courts are confronted with disputes with a transnational dimension, they
reach for a familiar toolbox-one with tools for fixing domestic problems. They
extrapolate from their experience with familiar domestic litigation, especially
interstate litigation. From the perspective of foreign litigants, this extrapolation is
sometimes beneficial. When full due process rights are extended to them, foreign
litigants are generally less susceptible to suit in the U.S. than if they were armed
only with protections accorded them under international law.0 2
As a
consequence, only a subset of foreign companies and individuals causing harm in
the U.S. can be sued here, ' 3 and only a subset of complex suits (e.g., interpleader,
multiple third-party claims) can be consolidated in a U.S. forum.0 4 But interstate
analogies can also cut the other way: Foreign defendants are amenable to tag
jurisdiction.0 They face the burden and expense of American-style discovery if
their adversary turns to section 1782.2" And personal jurisdiction tends to be
exercised over them based on an understanding of Asahi that has been shaped by
interstate precedents."7
The fact that interstate analogies sometimes benefit foreign litigants and
sometimes work to their detriment reinforces another impression one gets from
the case law: the use of interstate analogies by U.S. courts does not appear to be
result driven. One might hypothesize that interstate analogies are associated with
specific bottom-line outcomes (e.g., upholding the exercise of jurisdiction), but
manipulation of this sort does not seem to be at work. The case law discussed

202 For example, foreign civil litigants enjoy the same Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial as
domestic litigants, cf Grandfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (upholding right to jury trial
and making no distinction between foreign litigant and domestic litigant) even though no such right exists
under customary international law. A second example is that, in the context of complex litigation, a
foreign defendant cannot be required to defend a third-party suit in the U.S. absent satisfaction of the
minimum contacts test with respect to that specific defendant. Other legal systems are more permissive in
terms of consolidation. See, e.g., Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters L 12/1 O.J. (2001) art. 6(1) (European Union
rule regarding jurisdiction in actions involving multiple defendants).
203 See, e.g., Outokumpu Engineering Enterprises, Inc.
v. Kvaemer EnviroPower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724,
732 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996); Lichon v. Aceto Chemical Co., Ltd, 182 II1.App. 3d 672,685 (1 st Dist. 1989).
204 The federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335,
operates under the principle of minimal
diversity but still has limits. See State Farm v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967) (interpleader "cannot
be used to solve the vexing problems of multiparty litigation arising out of a mass tort" and was not
intended to be an all-purpose "bill of peace").
205 See

Part IV(B). supra.
Part IV(C), supra.
207 See Part IV(A), supra.
206 See
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above is not especially tainted by examples of interstate analogies seized upon
when they work to the detriment of alien litigants and cast aside, without
explanation, when they point in the opposite direction. Benefits and burdens
roughly balance out, and variations on interstate-international equivalence have
been a part of American procedural law for so long as to suggest that analogizing
in this way is one avenue by which American courts understand the wider legal
world, perhaps subconsciously. These analogies, are, in other words, a kind of
intellectual box that is sufficiently constraining as to require conscious effort to
think outside the box.
Before exploring the relationship between interstate-international
equivalence and American exceptionalism, I address some objections that might
be raised to what has been said thus far.
A. Objection No. 1: The Pervasiveness ofInterstate-International
Equivalence Has Been Overstated
The point of Part IV is not to suggest that American courts are
sleepwalking. The claim is not that state and federal judges are unaware that in
transnational cases there may be international law to apply or that the conduct of
litigation may have ramifications for U.S. foreign relations. Rather, Part IV
supports a claim far less sweeping but nonetheless important: there are patterns in
the way that American courts approach transnational legal relationships. One
such pattern is to use interstate relationships as a model and point of departure.
Rather than start from first principles, courts begin with a ready-made framework.
Rather than turn first to a defendant's litigation-related rights under international
law, courts immediately consider foreign litigants' rights under the U.S.
Constitution. In Asahi, for example, both opinions immediately turned to an
established framework under the Due Process Clause. Although this framework
originated in litigation traversing state boundaries, it was applied to litigation
traversing national boundaries. To get from one setting to the other requires an
intellectual jump (a leap, really) that can be seen in opinions dating back to the
early 1800s and that continues to the present day. Signs of this intellectual leap
surface in opinions from many time periods, from the era in which due process
was defined in terms of territoriality, to the current one in which minimum
contacts are the benchmark; from the era in which code pleading and trial by
stealth were the norm to the current era in which notice pleading and broad
pretrial discovery reign.
Part IV also is not meant to suggest the absence of counterexamples. The
data-judicial opinions from various time periods--do not line up so neatly.
There are indeed areas of procedural law in which distinctions are drawn between
the domestic and the international, and interstate analogies are either rejected or
greatly modified. For the sake of balance, one such area, parallel litigation, will
be discussed briefly.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens0 5 is one of the tools that American
courts employ to avoid the inefficiency of two similar lawsuits concurrently

208

See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).

2008

Is TransnationalLitigationa Distinct Field? The Persistenceof
Exceptionalism in American ProceduralLaw

343

proceeding to judgment in two different forums."9 In applying the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, a court assesses whether to allow a suit before it to go
forward or, rather, to be dismissed in favor of an action in another forum. Whether
a suit brought in a U.S. forum will be dismissed is strongly influenced by whether
the plaintiff is domestic or foreign.
The cases draw a distinction at the outset in terms of the source of law.
When the attempted move is from a court in the U.S. to one in another country,
the issue is controlled by common law." ' With the interstate version of forum non
conveniens (when the attempted move is from one federal district court to a
federal court in a different state), the controlling source of law is a federal statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1404." Next, a distinction is made with respect to presumptions.
When suit is brought by a U.S. plaintiff, the presumption is that the choice of
forum is not the result of forum shopping, or at least not the sort of forum
shopping that is disfavored--domestic plaintiffs are entirely at liberty to choose to
file suit in one state rather than in another. Thus for the domestic plaintiff, the
choice of forum is regarded as presumptively motivated by the natural desire to
litigate close to home, and the burden is on the defendant to show that proceeding
in a U.S. court would be an unwise use of public and private litigation resources.
In contrast, when a foreign plaintiff chooses a U.S. forum, that choice is accorded
no deference. The choice to litigate far from home is inherently suspect, and the
burden of persuasion runs the other way; the plaintiff must show that the balance
of public and private conveniences tilts in favor of allowing litigation to proceed
in the United States.2 2
Finally, a distinction is made at a third stage. Before sending the plaintiff
off to re-file elsewhere, the court must be convinced that there is an "adequate
alternative forum," another place where a comparable claim can be brought and
some reasonable remedy can be had." 3 When the other forum is located in the
U.S., the adequate-alternative-forum inquiry is perfunctory. The standard
typically is met by showing that the defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction
in some other district in the U.S., that venue in the other district is proper, and that
the applicable statute of limitations in that other place has not yet run out.2 4 In
transnational cases, the adequate-alternative-forum inquiry is not perfunctory.
Courts look beyond personal jurisdiction and statutes of limitations to such
209 Other tools (res judicata, collateral estoppel, full faith and credit) are
used with respect to

consecutive, rather than concurrent, litigation.
210 In federal courts, the question is controlled by federal common law. See
Vasquez v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. 325 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2003); Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A. 289 F.3d 1300
(11 th Cir. 2002). In state courts, the issue is controlled either by state statute or state common law. See
generallyMartin J. McMahon, Annotation, Forum Non Conveniens Doctrinein State Court asAffected by
Availability of Alternative Forum, 57 A.L.R. 4th 973 (1987 & Supp. 2006) (collecting cases and
referencing statutes).
211 When a transfer falls within the scope of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404, the mechanics of transfer are
straightforward. Unlike the international context, there is no uncertainty as to whether the second forum
will in fact proceed with the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), annotation (1982); 15 WRIGHT & MILLER:
FEDERAL PRAC. & PROC. § 3841.
212 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); [ragorri v. United
Technologies Corp., 274
F.3d. 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
213 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1165-66
(5th Cir. 1987);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, comment C (1971).
214 See Yang v. Odom, 409 F. Supp. 2d 599 (D.N.J. 2006).
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considerations as the subject matter jurisdiction of foreign courts, the
independence of their judges, potential bias, undue delay, impact on U.S. public
policy, and other factors.2 5
Thus judicial application of forum non conveniens shows that the
interstate and the international are not always treated as equivalent. It is not true
that American courts unreflectively employ domestic analogies all the time. But
they do so a lot. Discussion of counterexamples such as this one is worthwhile
for the sake of accuracy and balance, but consideration of such counterexamples
should not cause us to lose sight of a pattern that is both important and
underappreciated: the use of interstate analogies has been a part of American
procedural jurisprudence for a very long time. Its occurrence has continued in the
decades after key statutory changes (e.g., 28 U.S.C. §1782) and treaty
developments (e.g., ratification of various Hague Conference conventions)
seemed to signal a change in direction. Analogizing remains a frequent
interpretive move that is taken in such a wide variety of settings as to exert broad
influence over the way in which the American legal system confronts the wider
world. Even when judicial opinions make express distinctions between the
transnational and the domestic, some form of interstate analogy usually lurks in
the background.2 6
More importantly, the chief value of Part IV is in drawing attention to a
pattern that is rarely noticed. To the extent that a focus on vivid examples of
interstate-international equivalence fails to give equal time to counterexamples,
the imbalance would seem to be warranted if it effectively catches the attention of
transnationalists who forecast the steady ascendancy of American procedural law
from parochialism to cosmopolitanism without fully considering all the evidence.
To these transnationalists (with whom I am mostly in agreement in terms of
normative analysis), the analysis in Part IV is meant to raise an uncomfortable but
hopefully useful series of questions about the status of transnational law in the
United States: How can transnational litigation be a distinct field if U.S. courts
frequently view transnational cases as little more than variations on more familiar
domestic fact patterns? How can one celebrate the triumph of the transnational
perspective if American courts still rarely look to international or comparative law
for procedural norms, indeed, for any norms? How can we be confident in our
215 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note
2, at 415-24.
216

A fair examination of this last assertion would require a more detailed exposition than the scope

of the current article permits, but a few brief illustrations make the point. The American law relating to
parallel litigation is actually more complicated than presented above. So, for instance, in applying and
balancing the so-called "public factors" and "private factors," lower courts freely cite § 1404 precedents
when adjudicating cases governed by the federal common law of forum non conveniens and vice versa. In
fact there is little difference in the two contexts in terms of how these factors are either applied or weighed.
There is also some analogizing at work with respect to another tool for managing parallel litigation, the
anti-suit injunction. Though judicial opinions make clear that meddling in foreign proceedings differs
from meddling in redundant proceedings in some other federal district, see, e.g., Kirby v. Norfolk
Southern Railway Co., 71 F.Supp. 2d 1363 (N.D.Ga. 1999), they nonetheless routinely work off of the
same key interstate precedents. See, e.g, Goldhammer v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 59 F.Supp. 2d 248 (D.
Mass. 1999) citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines,731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) citing Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); see generally Louise Ellen Teitz, ParallelProceedings: Treading
Carefully, 33 INT'L LAWYER 403 (1999) (providing a survey of lower federal court applications of
Colorado River Water Conserv.Dist. v. UnitedStates, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)); George Bermann, The Use of
Anti-Suit Injunctions in InternationalLitigation,28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589 (1990) (comparing
interstate anti-suit injunction cases with transnational cases).
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forecasts of the future if the American legal system has confronted similar global
pressures before and has responded with only minor adjustments rather than a
full-scale reevaluation of dispute resolution from the perspective of the
transnational litigant?

B. Objection No. 2: A Focus on U.S. Courts is Too Narrow
Linda Silberman and Samuel Baumgartner2 7 raise another useful
objection: Even if American courts superimpose the domestic onto the
transnational, is not a focus almost exclusively on American case law too narrow?
Should not our opinion on whether transnational litigation is an autonomous field
turn on more than what American courts are doing? Should we not also give
thought to the wave of transnationalism sweeping through other parts of the
profession? The larger reality, they observe, is that transnational perspectives are
pervasive-in first-year case books, ' in daily law practice in large and small
cities,2 9 in legislation,220 and in the work of professional organizations, even those
that in the past focused on domestic legal matters.
In a recent article, Professor Silberman argues that current law reform
initiatives in the area of procedural law show that transnational perspectives have
made inroads into the way that Americans approach law reform."2 She is right.
Two projects of the American Law Institute do show a shift away from ALI's
22
traditionally domestic-centered focus. The Jurisdiction and Judgments Project,"
which began as an effort to draft implementing legislation for an anticipated
2P See Baumgartner, supra note 13, at 1297 & 1393 (arguing
that "taking transnational litigation
seriously as a field" will require proceduralists to undertake "in-depth procedural comparison and
international relations theory" and to "take an active role in discussing the relationship between domestic
approaches to transnational litigation and supranational and international trade organizations").
218 See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON, AND HELEN

HERSHKOFF, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (9th ed. 2006); THOMAS MAIN, GLOBAL
ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (2005); LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN, AND TOBIAS BARRINGTON
WOLFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2006); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L.
MINOW, MARK S. BRODIN, AND THOMAS 0. MAIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND
CONTEXT (3d ed. 2008).
219 See R. Doak Bishop, InternationalLitigation in Texas: Texas Rules of
Evidence and Recent
Changes in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 131 (1984); Adam J. Levitt, An
Illinois Lawyer's Guide to Service of Process in Mexico, 82 ILL. B.J. 434 (1994); James A. R. Nafziger,
InternationalandForeign Law Right Here in River City, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 4 (1998).
220 See NY Gen. Obligation Law § 5-1401 (permitting parties to "any contract ... arising
out of a
transaction covering in the aggregate not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars" to have New York
law apply "whether or not such contract ... bears a reasonable relation to this state"); NY Gen.
Obligations Law § 5-1402 (permitting access to a New York forum for that subset of contracts covered by
5-1401 for which the aggregate amount of the transaction is one million dollars or more). A major
purpose behind the enactment of these two provisions in 1984 was "to encourage parties in large
commercial transactions to choose New York as the forum in which to litigate their disputes." McKinney's
CPLR Rule 327, Practice Commentary C327:4; see also Credit Franqais Int'l, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera
de Commercio, C.A., 490 N.Y.S. 2d 670 (S.Ct. 1985) (interpreting 5-1401 and 5-1402 and observing that
"[j]ust as the dollar has become the international standard for monetary transactions, so may parties agree
that New York law is the standard for international disputes.")
221 See Silberman, supra
note 12.
222 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006). The reporters for the project were Professors
Silberman and Andreas Lowenfeld.
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Hague Conference treaty regulating the conditions under which the domestic
courts of one country would be required to recognize civil judgments entered in
another,223 had its roots in international soil. The proposed federal statute that
resulted from the effort calls for federalizing this area of procedural law as a way
of presenting foreign judgment-creditors with a uniform U.S. approach 24 and as a
way of making a set of legal questions more responsive to federal interests and
less beholden to state interests. The second effort, the ALI/UNIDROIT project on
Transnational Principles of Civil Procedure, 225goes beyond purely U.S. law
reform. A collaboration between the American Law Institute in the U.S. and the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") 2216in
Italy produced a set of specialized procedural rules and principles intended to
displace the ordinary domestic procedural rules applied by national courts in a
specific category of cases-commercial disputes in which the litigants are
nationals of or habitually resident in different countries or in which property in
one country is subject to claims asserted by a party from another country. Even
more so than the Jurisdiction and Judgments Project, the ALI/UNIDROIT effort
sought to draw upon insights from comparative law and sought to address major
differences between U.S. procedural norms and those prevailing in other
countries.2 Not only was the project championed by prestigious organizations on
both sides of the Atlantic, drafts were translated into more than ten languages and
vetted at workshops in nearly twenty countries.228
In the search for procedural norms, both efforts drew upon treaties, the
laws of legal systems other than the United States, and contemporary practices in
international arbitration.229 Participants in both efforts consciously tried to move
existing U.S. procedural law in a direction less dependant on domestic analogies
and domestic-centered policy analysis. 2 ' ALI's proposed judgment recognition
statute is less anchored in full faith and credit jurisprudence than the 1962
Uniform Act that it seeks to replace 2 ' and the commentary to the ALIIUNIDROIT
223 For background on the initial Hague
Jurisdiction and Judgments project and why it was
drastically scaled back, see SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON

JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:

TRANSATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL

LITIGATION (2003).
224 Currently, the recognition of foreign judgments is
largely governed by state law, and
notwithstanding the existence of the UFMJRA (see text accompanying note 62, supra), there is
considerable variation in the laws of the fifty states on this subject. In July 2005, NCCUSL promulgated
the:
"Uniform
Foreign-Country
Money
Judgments
Recognition
Act."
See
http://www.nccusl.orgUpdate/ActSearchResults.aspx. The Act revises the 1962 version of the UFMJRA.
Thus far, the 2005 version has been enacted in Colorado and Michigan.
225ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil
Procedure (2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/civilprocedure/main.htm.
226 UNIDROIT, an intergovernmental organization
based in Rome, was established in 1926. The
many multilateral conventions negotiated under UNIDROIT's auspices can be found at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm.
227 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra
note 225, at xvii (stating that the project "crossed divides
that
separate United States procedural law from the laws of virtually all other countries, including England,
Canada, and Australia").
228 Id. at 17-24.
229 See Silberman, supra note 12, at 1432-33 ("We drew on
comparative law, looking to the
experience of other countries with respect to their recognition and enforcement practices.").
230 Id.
231 See Linda J. Silberman and Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
A Different Challengefor the ALl: Herein of
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Principles repeatedly notes instances in which a practice. that may be appropriate
in purely domestic litigation should be regarded as inappropriate in transnational

cases. 232
These recent ALI initiatives certainly warrant consideration. It is
significant that ALL launched these two high profile efforts, both in the area of
procedural law, despite having done relatively little connected with international
or comparative law in the past. 3 Such developments suggest that in the near
future the perspective of American judicial opinions may differ from those in the
recent past, especially given the impact that ALI's work historically has had on
U.S. judges.
Despite this objection, there is good reason for paying more attention in
these pages to what American courts currently do than to what influential scholars
and lawyers urge that they do. To begin with, this is so because the evidence thus
far is thin as to whether these ALI initiatives are having or will have a substantial
impact on U.S. procedural law and practice. The lack of such evidence (these
initiatives are comparatively recent) is quite important because the American legal
system, far more than most, is judge-centered. No jurisprudential movement
ultimately succeeds in the United States unless it influences what courts do. A
fashion that becomes all the rage in the academy will nonetheless have limited
long term impact if the attention of the bench is not captured. No turn of events in
law practice produces a lasting paradigm shift unless it brings about some change
in the way that courts do their work. So, although it is fair to agree with Professor
Silberman that developments throughout the American legal profession have a
bearing upon how we assess the status of transnational law in the United States,
these developments need to be read in the context of3 a legal culture that is courtlaw. 1
centered, especially in the realm of procedural
It is not that the growing transnational orientation of American legal
education does not matter. It does. It is not that the past decade has not witnessed
significant developments toward the transnationalization of procedural law in the
European Union."' It has. It is not that these developments in the EU will not
ForeignCountry Judgments, an InternationalTreaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635 (2000).

The differences between the UFMJRA and the ALl initiative on judgment recognition becomes clear when
one examines the different processes that produced the two texts. The UFMJRA emerged from a process
dominated by state interests through the work of a body experienced in one aspect of the recognition
problem-harmonizing differences in sister-state laws. In contrast, the ALl Judgments Project started
from a different place. It was not constrained by interstate relationships and full faith and credit as a
template. Though state officials provided input into the ALl effort, state interests were never allowed to
eclipse the fundamentally international nature of the endeavor, an endeavor conceptualized not as bringing
the blessings of full faith and credit to the world but rather as building a bridge across the large abyss
separating certain U.S. litigation norms from those of other legal systems. Moreover, the ALI effort was
outward looking in a way that the UFMJRA was not. The drafting committee for the ALl statute devoted
considerable time to evaluating the jurisdictional practices and recognition practices of other countries.
232 See ALIJUNIDROIT Principles, supra note 225, Comment 2B ("Mere physical
presence as a
basis ofjurisdiction within the American federation has historical justification that is inapposite in modem
international disputes."); Comment II B (rejecting notice pleading in the context of transnational
litigation).
233 A notable exception was ALI's role in preparing the Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of
the United States.
234 This court-centeredness begins for every would-be lawyer with the
first reading assignment in the
first week of law school and lasts throughout legal studies to a greater extent than it does in other
countries.
235 Until the early 1970s, nearly all procedural law in Europe, including the law applicable
to
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trigger changes elsewhere with respect to the balance between domestic
procedural law and transnational procedural law.2"6 They might. It is not that the
normative views of legal scholars do not exert influence. They sometimes do.
But even when combined, all of these ingredients still do not make a cake, at least
not in the United States. The main point of the case analysis in Part IV is to show
that it is still unclear whether a crucial ingredient-an engaged and proactive
bench-is part of the mix. The value of focusing on interstate-international
equivalence in the work product of U.S. courts is in challenging transnationalists
to wrestle with an important set of data that calls into question whether their
preferred normative outcome will prevail.
C. Objection No. 3: The Time Frame is Too Short
Another objection is that even if one focuses primarily on the perceptions
and behavior of U.S. judges, a time frame of two decades is too short in which to
perceive a substantial shift. On the American bench, where many judges have life
tenure and the turnover is gradual, change takes place slowly. Some of the more
important changes attributable to the legal realism movement of the 1930s did not
come about until the 1960s and later. The law and economics movement began
several decades ago, but arguably the pervasiveness of its impact on judicial
reasoning is just being felt now. It would be unrealistic to expect that the global
forces that are prompting change in law firm behavior and changes in the
academy would quickly surface in judicial opinions. Only recently has a
significant subset of American judges begun interacting regularly with judges
from other countries. Only since 2002 has the annual meeting of the American
Society of International Law included regular keynote addresses by justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court.2 37 Only with widespread use of the intemet has it become
possible to obtain legal sources easily and inexpensively from around the world.
Only in the last decade has a significant effort been made in the U.S. to create
judicial education programs on international and comparative law.238 Only now is
the American bench becoming populated with people who were offered a wide
selection of international and comparative law courses in law school and who
became familiar with transnational scenarios in law practice, before becoming
judges.
This objection too has some merit. If one looks again to Europe, one sees
transborder litigation, was national law. Today, a substantial and growing body of procedural law is panEuropean and applies only to cases involving litigants from different countries. EU courts, in interpreting
legislation in the field of private international law, frequently insist that terms be given autonomous
definitions-meanings different from those associated with the same terms in national legal systems. See
Anna Gardella & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law andMarket Integration: The EC
Approach to Conflicts ofJurisdiction, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 611 (2003).
236In the last two decades, the situation in Europe has changed
markedly. The EU legislative
process has produced a substantial and growing body of new procedural law applicable solely to
transborder disputes. A list of initiatives can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/doc-centre/ci
vil/doc civil_introen.htm, the website of the European Commission.
237 For the text of these keynote addresses, see Proc.
of the Ann. Meeting of the Am. Soc "y ofInt'l
Law (Sandra Day O'Connor (2002), Stephen Breyer (2003), Antonin Scalia (2004), Ruth Bader Ginsburg
(2005), Anthony Kennedy (2006)).
238 See Frans J. Vanistendael, Blitz Survey of the Challenges for Legal Education
in Europe, 18
DICK. J. INT'L L. 457, 458-59, 463-66 (2000).
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that the increasingly autonomous character of EU law (autonomous from the legal
systems of the EU's member states) did not happen overnight. Change resulted
from decades of planning and funding by the European Commission and years of
effort by European law faculties in implementing required courses, creating panEuropean student and faculty exchanges, and creating specific institutes whose
work has emphasized the autonomous character of European Union law." 9 The
first texts in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland devoted specifically to
international civil procedure and transnational litigation appeared long before
transnational litigation was truly an autonomous field in those countries."'
But those who say that we are now witnessing the emergence of a
transnational system of justice with the inevitable entry of U.S. courts as full
participants2 41 may find such a prediction unfulfilled. It may well be that the
cumulative force of so many developments on so many fronts ultimately will
transform the American bench. But maybe not. At other times in the past, the
stars seemed to be aligned for major change. With the U.S. rise to global
economic and political dominance after World War II, the forces seemed to be in
place to cause the American bench and legal profession to assume a global
leadership role in judicial cooperation, harmonization of procedural law, and
support for international tribunals. It did not happen. The legislative initiatives of
the 1960s promoted the American model of dispute resolution, but (contrary to
prediction) few countries followed and few compromises were reached.242 The
United States joined the Hague Conference, UNIDROIT, and other organizations
concerned with bridging differences among legal systems, but U.S. delegations to
those organizations often did little bridging, and in interpreting the texts that did
emerge, American courts leaned toward unilateralism.243 The United States was
instrumental in creating the International Court of Justice, arguably the
centerpiece of international adjudication, but also instrumental in making the ICJ
a weak institution for much of its life.2"
The results may be different this time. Arguably, the latest wave of
globalization is different from those that have come before. But, then again, to
nearly every generation the present seems different than the past. It is indeed true
See DAVID BEDERMAN WITH CHRISTOPHER J. BORGEN & DAVID A. MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (2001) (materials used in connection with the Judicial Outreach Program
of the American Society of International Law).
240 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, TransnationalLitigation in the United
States: The Emergence ofa
New Field of Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 793, 794 (2007) (book review).
241 See Donald Francis Donovan, Remarks at Annual Meeting, American Society of International
Law (Mar. 30, 2007) reported in The Future of International Law: Proceedings of the 101st Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law 376 (2007); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an
International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000); Steinhardt, supra note 2, at 2; Melissa Waters, Mediating
Norms and Identity: The Role ofTransnationalJudicialDialogue in CreatingandEnforcingInternational
Law, 93 GEO. L. J. 497, 502-05 (2005).
239

242

See text accompanying notes 58-71 supra.

243 See text accompanying notes 67-68, 81-91, supra;cf BAUMGARTNER, supra note 223 at 30-41

(arguing that "unilateralism... has controlled U.S. approaches to transnational litigation for quite some
time" and that U.S. treaty negotiation in the field of private international law is characterized by "actively
promot[ing] the chosen U.S. approach and impatience with foreign solutions").
244 See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986)
(analyzing Reagan
administration decision to pull out of ICJ proceedings against Nicaragua).
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that American courts are receiving a tremendous number of transnational inputs.
But the current period is not completely unique in that respect either. Earlier
periods also saw the U.S. legal system on the receiving end of foreign and
international law and litigation involving foreign parties.2 45 In short, we need to be
skeptical of the claim that external circumstances alone will bring about the
transnationalization of the American judiciary. We need to be more mindful of
factors that the existing literature on transnational litigation downplays, such as
the tendency of the U.S. legal system to be inward looking and out of sync with
others. We need to confront American exceptionalism.
VI. THE PERSISTENCE OF EXCEPTIONALISM IN AMERICAN PROCEDURAL
LAW

The claim that transnational litigation in the United States should be (and
is well on its way to becoming) a separate field transcends discussion about the
growing specialization of litigation practice in the United States. At stake in the
debate about the status of transnational litigation is whether the American legal
system is entering a new period of openness to outside influences and, if so,
whether or not this is to be applauded. At issue is whether the U.S. approach to
adjudication should retain core features that distinguish it from other legal
systems: notice pleading, broad and expensive pretrial discovery, a permissive
2 the predominance
approach toward concurrentjurisdiction and forum shopping, 46
247
of multi-factored tests rather than clear rules, the important role assigned to lay
persons as jurors, high rates of settlement, unusually high damages awards, the
availability or threat of punitive damages, the presumption against awarding
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. In short, the manner in which the issue was
first framed by Born & Westin and has been discussed ever since has tended to
obscure a central inquiry: Will American exceptionalism in procedural law fall
victim to globalization? Should it?
With the term "exceptionalism" I mean to link the analysis carried on thus
far in this article with the rich body of literature, some of it dating back nearly two
centuries,248 about the nature of American society and its relationship to law: In
what ways does reliance on and reverence for law distinguish American society?
In what respects is the way that courts function in American life unique?
The expansive social science literature on American exceptionalism
touches upon subjects as diverse as social mobility, the importance of
See generally MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914 (2004); David J. Bederman, The Feigned Demise ofPrize, 9 EMORY J.
INT'L REv. 31 (1995); Lavinbuk, supra note 22.
246 That is, should it retain a permissive approach
to forum shopping among courts in different states.
Post-InternationalShoe and in the wake of the American revolution in conflict of laws, it is not unusual
for a plaintiff to have a choice of where to sue the defendant and for differences in the law applied by
courts in different fora to be a basis for forum shopping. The Erie doctrine is not designed to discourage
forum shopping among different state-court systems, but rather among state courts and federal courts in
the same state.
247 See BAUMGARTNER, supra
note 223, at 12 (observing that to Europeans the "frequent
use of
interest-balancing tests appears crude and unsophisticated").
248 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba
Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (1840).
245
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immigration, the centrality of race, the reasons for high crime rates, the
significance of being adjacent to militarily weak neighbor countries, and the

enduring conviction that the American experiment (in self-government, in
economic liberty, in the rule of law) has global significance.
In the legal academy, American scholars today show a fresh interest in
American exceptionalism. Recent work illuminates American exceptionalism in
such substantive fields of law as criminal law,249 freedom of expression,"'
privacy,25 human rights,252 election law,253and other subjects. Some of this work
comes from reformers, unhappy with the status quo in the United States on such
matters as capital punishment or the legal status of gays and lesbians. For
scholars in this group, comparison is a tool for bringing about change in
substantive U.S. law.
For a second group, American exceptionalism is a cause for celebration.
Like the reformers, the "celebrationists" find that the differences between the U.S.
legal system and those of other countries run deep. Unlike the reformers, those in
this second group discern in these differences a healthy diversity of opinion, a
predictable set of responses to different circumstances, or evidence of American
superiority. In foreign affairs law, for example, those who celebrate American
exceptionalism (so-called "New Sovereigntists," to use Peter Spiro's phrase 54)

brandish a wariness of international institutions and multilateralism as a badge of

honor.5 In human rights law, the defenders of the U.S. jurisprudence under the
Alien Tort Statute make no excuses for the U.S. legal system's innovation in
employing its courts to adjudicate civil claims for human rights violations that
often have little connection to the United States. Rather, scholars and NGOs urge

See, e.g., International Center for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief (2007) availale
at
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbriefwpb stats.php?area=all&category-wb-poprate
(reporting that the United States has the largest prison population in the world and also the highest
incarceration rate); Carol S. Steiker, CapitalPunishment andAmerican Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 57, 57 (Michael Ingatieff ed., 2005) (observing that the few
countries that, in addition to the United States, vigorously employ the death penalty are "generally ones
that the United States has the least in common with politically, economically, or socially").
250 See, e.g., RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS
CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2006); Michel
Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in ComparativePerspective:A ComparativeAnalysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523
(2003); Frederick Schauer, The ExceptionalFirstAmendment in Ignatieff, supra note 248, at 30-56.
251See. e.x.. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western CulturesofPrivacy:Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
252 Particularly the relative lack of social and economic rights in the U.S. constitution. See Cass
R.
Sunstein, Why Does the U.S. ConstitutionLack Social andEconomic Guarantees?in Ignatieff, supra note
249, at 90-110.
253 See generally Symposium: Democracy and Elections
in North America: What Can We Learn
from Our Neighbors? 3 ELECTION L. J. 395 (2004).
.54See Peter Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism
and Its False Prophets,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000.
255 See ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE
RULE OF JUDGES 15, 19, 21 (2003)
(decrying the "internationalization of law" asserting that the "United States should not make the mistake of
accepting that treaties have the force of law no matter what vital interests of the nation are at stake," and
arguing that "[i]nternational law is not law but politics"); Curtis A. Bradley, InternationalDelegations,the
Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2002); Julian G. Ku, The
Delegation ofFederalPowerto InternationalOrganizations:New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MNN.
L. REV. 71 (2000); John Yoo and Will Trachman, Less Than BargainedFor: The Use of Force and the
DecliningRelevance of the United Nations, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 379 (2005).
249
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other countries to follow the American lead." 6 For celebrationists on both the
right and the left, tampering with American exceptionalism presents the risk of
diluting what is exceptionally good about the American tradition with respect to
law, courts, and constitutionalism.
Transnationalists disagree. Transnationalists specializing in procedural
law tend to see America's modem encounter with globalization and its byproduct,
transnational litigation, as requiring significant change in American procedural
law, change that, in the opinion of some, involves more than multilateral treaties
and the occasional creation of specialized U.S. procedural rules. 257 Rather, the
globalization of business and the globalization of due process... produce basic
insights about the nature and limits of adjudication, and these insights plausibly
could cause legislators and judges to rethink the basic way in which the U.S. legal
system manages all litigation, domestic and transnational. Put differently, the
core of the transnationalist position is that even if the primary influence of
comparative civil procedure currently is in assessing how U.S. courts should
adjudicate a circumscribed category of cases (those with a transnational
component), that influence is unlikely to remain confined to such a narrow area.
Eventually the insights gained from familiarity with the procedural law of other
countries and with emerging global procedural norms will affect U.S. views on
wholly domestic dispute resolution.259 U.S. domestic procedural law may change
in significant ways.
Although the transnationalist position is rarely stated in terms as sweeping
as in the previous paragraph, this is a fair statement of what prominent
transnationalists envision.26 ° Indeed, their vision can be disaggregated into three
parts. Two are descriptive and one is normative. The first is that during the
twentieth century, American procedural law steadily grew different from that of
other countries, even from Great Britain. Key markers on this path to divergence
were the introduction of the Federal Rules, the move from territoriality to
minimum contacts in personal jurisdiction, the rise of public law litigation,26 and
256 See, e.g., Beth Stevens, TranslatingFilartiga:
A ComparativeandInternationalLawAnalysis of
Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 YALE INT'L L. J. 1(2002); Elizabeth
van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the
Context of the ProposedHague Judgments Convention,42 HARV. INT'L L. J.141 (2001). I include myself
in this group. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Proposalsof the Hague Conference and their Effect on Efforts to
Enforce InternationalHuman Rights Through Adjudication, 117 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, WORKING DOCUMENT SERIES (1998).
257 Paul Berman, for instance, argues
that judges need to change the way they see themselves;
they
need to "think of themselves as cosmopolitan transnational actors," Paul Schiff Berman, Judges as
Cosmopolitan TransnationalActors,12 TULSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109, 110 (2004).
258 See, for example, Judge Richard Posner's
articulation of "international due process" in Society of
Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and
Decree: InternationalReview ofNational Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2123-39 (2004).
259See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., International "Harmonization"
ofProceduralLaw, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1665, 1668-69 (1998) (comparing the international harmonizing potential of the ALI/UNIDROIT project
to the harmonizing impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Anthony J. Scirica, Judge's
Response to Professors Hazard and Taruffo, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 519, 519 (2006) ("[T]he
Transnational Principles and Rules may cause us to reexamine the foundations of our respective
procedural rules with a view toward considering revisions. Over time, this reexamination may encourage
transnational harmonization of civil procedure.").
260At the 2007 annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law, Donald Donovan
argued that recent developments in international litigation and arbitration point to the creation of a "truly
international system ofjustice." See Donovan, supra note 241.
261 See Abram Chayes, Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982);
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the revolution in choice of law methodology.262 By the late 1970s, the American
approach to civil justice differed greatly from competing models.
The second component, also descriptive, is that in the final decades of the
twentieth century, globalization caused the brakes to be applied (albeit lightly) to
this divergence. In the U.S., a second wave of transnationalism brought a renewal
of efforts dating from the 1960s to create a procedural law more finely tuned to
the challenges posed by cases involving foreign parties, foreign law, or the need
for the assistance of foreign authorities. International forum shopping began to
look different from domestic forum shopping.263 In choice of law, the Second
Restatement held out the promise that the interests and policies of foreign
countries would not routinely be treated as if they were the interests and policies
of sister states." And, fairly read, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi said that
due process had to be understood as context dependant, so an assertion of
jurisdiction that would be reasonable in an interstate setting might not be
reasonable in an international setting. Some of the expectations triggered by these
developments have come about.265

Third, and normatively, the transnationalist view is that procedural
change and judicial innovation in at least one category of cases (those with a
transnational dimension) is to be welcomed. After all, the trans-substantive ideal
has never been well suited to disputes in which U.S. courts interact closely with
foreign legal systems. Little of the basic U.S. approach was developed with such
cases in mind. Therefore, we should be hesitant to insist on a single set of
procedural rules when doing so poses both the risk of imposing unfair
disadvantages on foreign litigants and creating wide-ranging conflict with foreign
countries. Rather, we need to be open to the prospect that even basic aspects of
the system, such as the right to a civil jury trial, perhaps should not operate in the
exact same way in transnational cases as in domestic ones."' Finally, this set of
normative claims raises a wider set of questions. While we are rethinking the role
ofjuries in transnational cases, perhaps we should reexamine the role ofjuries in
all civil cases. While we are considering access to federal court for foreign
litigants, perhaps we should revisit access to federal courts on the basis of
diversity of citizenship in general. In other words, the now ongoing American
encounter with foreign legal systems must not only be regarded as a challenge to
accommodate the basic assumptions of our procedural law with the equally
fundamental views of foreign countries. It must also be a learning experience and
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281(1976).
262See supra notes
33 & 38.
263 Under PiperAircraftv. Reyno, for example, a foreign
plaintiffs choice of a U.S. forum is entitled
to less deference in a forum non conveniens analysis than is the choice of a U.S. plaintiff. See 454 U.S.
235,255-56 (1982).
264

(1971).

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 10

265 See Born & Rutledge, supra note
2, at 142-44.
266For a thoughtful discussion of the jury trial in

relation to the ALI/UNIDROIT Transnational
Principles project, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Jury Trial and the Principles of TransnationalCivil
Procedure,25 PF". ST. INT'L L. REV. 499 (2006): see also Rolf Sturner Some European Remarks on a
New Joint Projectof the American Law Institute and UNIDROIT, 34 INT'L LAWYER 1071, 1074 (2000)
("The jury trial is the main source of mistrust and aversion of European defendants in the United States as
a forum of international litigation").
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an opportunity for self-reflection.
My disagreement with this three-stage account is not with the normative
position. I agree that the complications associated with transnational dispute
resolution--e.g., complications relating to language, parallel proceedings,
judgment enforcement-frequently warrant a variance from the established
doctrine applied in wholly domestic cases. Rather, my disagreement is with the
descriptive account given by a number of scholars who have advanced this
normative view.
For all their differences, what the reformers and the celebrationists most
have in common is the sense that the United States is not just different, but much
different. They share the view that fundamental aspects of U.S. law - for
example, the widespread constitutionalization of so many legal issues and the
pervasiveness of federalism--run so deep that radical change moving the U.S.
substantially in the direction of other legal systems is unlikely, at least within a
short span of time. Ironically, this similarity is perhaps what most differentiates
these two groups from the transnationalists discussed throughout this article. As a
group, transnationalists operating in the realm of procedural law are also keenly
aware of the many significant differences between U.S. procedural norms and
those that prevail in other countries. But as a group, they share the conviction that
U.S. procedural law is headed for change, toward greater similarity with emerging
global standards of procedural justice, in the direction of losing some of its
exceptionalism. So, when the American Law Institute launched its project on
Transnational Rules and Principles of Civil Procedure, it did so expecting that the
gap between American norms of pretrial discovery and continental norms could
be bridged, that a fusion of the best of both approaches could be engineered in the
near future. As of this writing, there are serious questions as to whether the
ALI/UNIDROIT effort will have any measurable impact on U.S. judicial practice.
Similarly, when the U.S. delegation to the Hague Conference on Private
International Law spent the better part of a decade attempting to negotiate a broad
multilateral treaty regulating the assertion of jurisdiction by national courts and
providing for the recognition of foreign-country judgments, it was acting on the
optimistic view that a mixed convention-a kind of middle ground between the
Brussels Convention and U.S. norms--might serve as a step in the direction of
harmonization, as a way station of sorts for American migration away from
exceptionalism.267 Few American judges had an interest in the negotiations, and
those who did tended to see more pitfalls than possibilities.268
267 The "mixed convention" idea was proposed by the late Professor
Arthur von Mehren, one of the
United States' foremost scholars in comparative law and conflict of laws, see Arthur T. von Mehren,
EnforcingJudgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design ofRecognition Conventions, 24 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 17 (1998), and pursued vigorously by the U.S. delegation. For an extended period of time, the
effort largely turned into a bilateral negotiation between the United States and the EU countries, with wide
differences in the basic approach to personal jurisdiction. See Prelim. Doc. No. 16, "Some Reflections on
the Present State of Negotiations on the Judgments Project in the Context of the Future Work Programme
of the Conference," Hague Conference on Private International Law 5-8 (Feb. 2002) available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genjpdl6e.pdf. Ultimately the scope of the project was cut back
drastically, for many reasons, including an unbridgeable gap between an expansive, activity-based
approach to jurisdiction by the United States and a strong opposition to this approach by a large majority
of other delegations. What emerged from nearly ten years of effort was the Choice of Courts Convention.
See supra note 156.
268These observations are based in part on workshops that the author conducted
regarding the Hague
jurisdiction and judgments treaty negotiations with federal and state judges. These workshops were held
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The analysis presented here is inspired to some degree by the ease with
which transnational scholars in procedural law seem to be underestimating the
depth of American exceptionalism. There is irony in this; the current crop of
American scholars in civil procedure and conflict of laws is perhaps as well
versed in the comparative and international dimensions of their field as any group
of American legal scholars and any generation of American proceduralists.
Because today's transnationalist arguments are advanced by people with no
misconception regarding the uniqueness of American civil justice, the present
work does not dwell on the familiar list of such differences in procedural law
between the U.S. and other countries: approaches to joinder and class actions,
contingency fees, the selection ofjudges, the input of expert witnesses, and so on.
Instead, the goal here is more modest and more focused: I seek to draw attention
to an aspect of American exceptionalism that is infrequently noticed and,
apparently, easily forgotten. And that is the longstanding penchant of American
courts for bringing principles of interstate federalism to bear on litigation that is
international rather than interstate in scope. A critical and longstanding aspect of
U.S. exceptionalism in procedural law is to regard the frameworks and principles
developed to deal with interstate legal problems as a model for addressing
problems that are international in scope. Generations ofjurisprudence and theory
developed with the purpose of refining the American conception of federalism are
enlisted to help the U.S. legal system navigate its way through a rising tide of civil
disputes that are transnational in scope. The assertion ofjurisdiction over foreign
entities is regarded as a variation on the problem of asserting jurisdiction over outof-state defendants. Domestic choice-of-law jurisprudence is put to work in
deciding which law should apply to controversies connected to two or more
countries. Rules for interpreting domestic sources of law are readily applied to
international and foreign sources of law. Foreign-country judgments are equated
with sister-state judgments. The model forjudicial cooperation in the international
context is judicial cooperation in the interstate context. In short, in repeated
waves of juridical transnationalism, Americans have displayed a habit of seeing
the wider world in their own image. And American courts in particular continue
to display an inclination to regard the American experience in federalism---fifty
sovereign states bound together by a federal constitution-as yielding insights
applicable in an international context.
Moreover, the last two decades of cases show something even more
revealing. It is not as though judges applying Burnham do not know the
nationality or domicile of the person "tagged" with service of process. It is not as
if the state and federal bench is wholly unaware that the rest of the world has a
different view of pretrial discovery than the United States. Nonetheless, in
opinion after opinion the implications of these facts about the world are not
explored. In other words, from the viewpoint of those who want to see U.S.
procedural law in one particular category of cases move away from
exceptionalism and towards a rapprochement with other legal systems, it is not
solely, or even mainly, a knowledge problem. It appears to be deeper than that.
For many on the U.S. bench, interstate federalism is a metric for understanding a
at the 2002 annual meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices and the 2002 Federal Judicial Center
workshop for judges of the Second and D.C. Circuits.
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host of procedural issues that arise when a dispute spills across borders, regardless
of the character of the border.
The misuse of domestic analogies may be a product of intellectual
confusion, but it can yield concrete, real-world harms. Treating transnational
disputes as close cousins of domestic ones tends to cloud the question of what
procedural rights should be extended to foreign litigants. Guided by interstate
analogies, U.S. courts typically regard the issue as one of constitutional law rather
than international law. 69 In determining the procedural rights of foreign litigants,
courts look to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than to treaties or to
customary international law.270 This can lead to an overextension of rights (such as
when the U.S. legal system declines to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign litigant,
even under circumstances when international law would permit the exercise of
jurisdiction)"' and also to an under-extension of rights, such as when a U.S. court
asserts jurisdiction over a foreign litigant under circumstances in which
international law frowns on such a basis for asserting jurisdiction. 7' In the
context of pretrial discovery, the interstate perspective leads U.S. courts into
friction with foreign courts even when the intent is to be cooperative. And too
little appellate review is extended to section 1782 rulings because minimal
appellate review is the norm in domestic discovery practice.
The chief problem with much of the American literature on transnational
civil litigation is that it ignores what American courts are actually doing. For all
the strengths of the normative arguments advanced by transnationalists, their
descriptive account is flawed. Changes in law practice, legal education, and
global business are offered as evidence of the inevitability of major changes in the
way that the U.S. legal system relates to the wider world. To be sure, the changes
brought on by the latest wave of globalization are real, but as Part IV shows, it is a
leap of faith to infer that the American legal system will respond systematically
and not incrementally and marginally, as it has in the past. Such a leap requires
one to put aside the fact that such prescriptions have been offered before, only to
go unheeded.
The claim that transnational litigation in the United States has become a
separate field is, at bottom, a claim that the American legal system is becoming
less distinct, less different from other legal systems, and more open to outside
influences. It is a claim that, at least in one area of procedural law, Americans are
prepared to look more extensively at what other countries do and let go of what
269
270

See Parrish, supra note 46, at 19-28.
See Born, supra note 72, Strauss, supra note 112, Weintraub, supra note 112.

271 Consider, for example, multiparty litigation. Under article 6(1) of the Brussels Regulation,
a codefendant in a multi-defendant action can be sued "in the courts for the place where any [defendant] is
domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings." European
Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, O.J. L 12 (Jan. 16, 2001). In the United States, the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments have been construed as not permitting consolidation in this manner. Regardless of how
efficient it would be to consolidate litigation in one forum, there must be a constitutionally adequate basis
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over each defendant. See New York Life Ins. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S.
518, 520-21 (1916). Due process also imposes limits on consolidating all potential plaintiffs in one
action. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 739-40 (1977) (interpleader action).
272

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF

THE UNITED STATES §421; Burbank, supra note 136, at 116 (commenting on the Burnham case and "the
continuing use of a jurisdictional standard that the rest of the world regards as exorbitant").
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has been a theme in international private law litigation in U.S. courts-projecting
fundamental aspects of the American legal system, such as interstate federalism,
onto the international legal system. The data presented here suggest that, at this
point in time, these claims are still more aspirational than real.

